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INTANGIBLES CONTRACTS: THOUGHTS OF HUBS,
SPOKES, AND REINVIGORATING ARTICLE 2
RAYMOND T. NIMMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The current sources of commercial law are survivors from a
different age. U.C.C. Article 2 was drafted in the 1950's. The
basics of consumer law were enacted by the early 1970's. Article
9 was last revised in the early 1970's. This contract law struc-
ture has served as the status quo for decades, but this status
quo ended several years ago under the weight of a radically
changing economic system and a new set of political and practi-'
cal realities. By the end of this decade, every article of the
U.C.C. will be revised and at least two new U C.C. articles will
have been promulgated.
This Article deals with U.C.C. Article 2. Article 2 comprises
the basic contract law of the U.C.C. Although Article 2 focuses
on the sale of goods, its influence extends much further. Courts
and commentators have interpreted what constitutes "goods"
broadly and also have applied Article 2 by analogy to transac-
tions far outside its substantive scope.' Yet, even as the reach of
Article 2 extended, the world changed. The transactions that
drive the modern economy often are not sales. Their subject
matter often has nothing to do with "goods." In today's "service
economy," the service sector outstrips the sale or manufacture of
goods in economic significance. The information industry yields
over $90 billion in revenues;2 it is already larger than all but a
* Acting Dean and Leonard Childs Professor of Law, University of Houston Law
Center. B.A., 1966, J.D., 1968, Valparaiso Umversity. Professor Nimmer is the Re-
porter on Technology Issues for the Drafting Committee to Revise Article 2.
1. See, e.g., Xerox v. Hawkes, 475 A.2d 7 (N.H. 1984) (service agreement);
Dilhman & Assocs. v. Capitol Leasing Co., 442 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)
(equipment lease); Hertz Commercial Leasing v. Transp. Credit Clearing House, 298
N.Y.S.2d 392 (New York City Civ. Ct. 1969) (same); see also LTV Federal Credit
Union v. UMIC Gov't See., 523 F Supp. 819 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (standby commitment
agreement), af'd, 704 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 163 (1984).
2. Blowden Tarter, Information Liability: New Interpretations for the Electronic
Age, 11 COMPUTER/L.J. 481, 483 (1992).
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few of the hard goods sectors and is growing at a more rapid
rate than any hard goods or manufacturing sector of the econo-
my. This is an "information age."3
In March 1993, the Article 2 Drafting Committee adopted a
working policy to the effect that the Article 2 revisions should
encompass licensing contracts involving software and related
intangibles.' This working policy and the implications of the
changes in our economy for the revision of Article 2 are the sub-
jects of this Article.
Part II describes some of the reasoning that supports the deci-
sion to bring intangibles within Article 2, especially intangibles
contracts that involve computer software and data. In part, this
builds on the fact that many software and intangibles contracts
are already governed by Article 2, even though Article 2 applies
a transactional model to these contracts that is inappropriate.
In part, also, the reasons to include intangibles reflect a pref-
erence for dealing with important fields of commercial contract
through codification, rather than pure common law development.
Codification is more likely to yield commercially relevant, sup-
portive contract law principles. It creates a process in which
commercial practice and the means for facilitating it can be
examined by experts outside litigation where one must resolve
specific, existing disputes.
Contract law is a practical discipline that aims to affect and
shape the voluntary behavior of companies and individuals en-
gaged in contractual relationships. However, modern contract
scholarship vividly documents the difficulty of achieving this
consistently in practice.5 We know little about how law affects
3. See J. Shoven, Intellectual Property Rights and Economic Growth, in INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CAPITAL FORMATION IN THE NEXT DECADE 46 (Charles
E. Walker & Mark A. Bloomfield, eds., 1988). This correlates to an enhanced inter-
est in academic literature on defining the content of intellectual property law. See,
e.g., Frank Easterbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 108 (1990); Wendy Gordon, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and
the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149 (1992); Raymond T. Nimmer & Patri-
cia A. Krauthaus, Information as Property: Databases and Commercial Property, 1
OXFORD INTIL J. LAW & INFO. SCIENCE 3 (1993).
4. Raymond Nimmer & Richard Speidel, Hub and Spoke Concepts in Article 2:
Discussion Memorandum 1 (memorandum presented to the Article 2 Revision Draft-
ing Committee on Sept. 5, 1993).
5. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and
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behavior. But, despite this uncertainty, a commercial law of con-
tracts will continue to develop. This indicates that we should
draft rules that encourage contract flexibility by allowing the
parties to define their own relationship and adopt background or
default rules that draw on the shared expertise of actual com-
mercial contracting as a gauge for what rules are appropriate.
The better process to develop a commercial law that accomplish-
es these goals is codification, where principles and process of
contract can be discerned in a forum divorced from particular
disputes and in a setting where experts and participants can
contribute to the formulation of law.
Yet, codification is not appropriate for all types of contract or
for all contract issues in any field. I suggest several criteria that
identify when or whether codification should be undertaken.
Applying these to intangibles contracts, a decision to formalize
codification of contract law on intangibles is a natural extension
of the Commercial Code to reflect national commercial behavior.
Intangibles contracts involve significant national industries of
commercial importance; they engage a transactional format and
subject matter different from the sale of goods. Many intangibles
licenses are now governed by Article 2, but Article 2 was drafted
for the sale of goods.6 The resulting problems are numerous and
the failure to fit modern law to modern commercial practice is
significant. The revised Article 2 should remedy this situation. If
not, the revision will fail to address the sea of change in com-
merce that, more than anything else, justifies revision of Article
2 at this point in time.
In Part III, I discuss the structure of Article 2, and make two
basic points. The first deals with differentiation. If intangibles
contracts fall within the U.C.C., separate treatment is required
at least in part because commercially significant differences
exist between a license and a sale as well as between intangibles
and goods. All of these commercial transactions may draw on a
common core of basic contract principles, but each also demands
the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 733 (1992) (noting that cer-
tain default rules are "theoretically efficient' but that "there is small hope that law-
makers will be able to divine the efficient rule in practice").
6. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
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some specially tailored rules to reflect the type of contractual
relationship that exists in commercial fact. Codification, to be
effective, must reflect both the commonalities and the transac-
tional or subject matter difference.
In Part IV, I deal with the second structural point. In an era
of economic and technological change, the structure of Article 2
must accommodate future growth and change. Historically, the
assumption has been that discrete transactions and subject mat-
ters should be dealt with under different contract rules, reflected
either in common law or in stand-alone articles of the U.C.C.'
This apparent belief in the categorical nature of commercial con-
tracts belies the fact that, while there are significant differences
relevant to contract law in different transactions and subject
matters, we truly do not believe that commercial contracts are
entirely discrete. While some aspects of transactions must draw
on different contract law rules, others clearly should draw from
a common core of contract theory and doctrine.
In 1993, the Article 2 Drafting Committee adopted a prelimi-
nary working policy that supports incorporation of software and
related intangibles contracts into Article 2 through a "hub and
spoke" configuration.' The "hub" consists of general principles.
Promulgated in the U.C.C., a hub of codified contract law can
bring to contracts outside of sales, leases, and licenses the bene-
fits of visible, nationally consistent rules. This would enhance
the flexibility of Article 2 to provide guidance on new transac-
tions by direct application and by analogy. The "spokes," on the
other hand, reflect that different transactions require different
background law principles. The spoke idea postulates that there
are differences in what contract law should underlie sales con-
tracts, leases, licenses, services contracts, and other commercial
deals. The differences are important. The spokes allow trans-
actionally relevant differences to be hung from the basic contract
law hub with new frameworks evolving as the transactions ma-
ture into commercial significance.
7. See, e.g., U.C.C. art. 2A (lease of goods); id. art. 4A (funds transfers).
8. See Raymond T. Nimmer et al., License Articles Under Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: A Proposal, 19 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 281 (1993);
Raymond T. Nimmer, Services Contracts: The Forgotten Sector of Commercial Law,
26 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 725 (1993).
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Under a hub and spoke model, Article 2 would cease to be a
"sale of goods" article; it would become an article dealing with
commercial "transfers of personal property." Since the hub and
spoke concept remains to be fully explicated by the Article 2
Drafting Committee, it is premature to attempt a full discussion
of its implications. Here I subscribe to a more limited goal: dis-
cussing only some issues that arise when one undertakes to de-
fine what might constitute a core of commercial contract law
applicable to the hub of new Article 2.
II. INTANGIBLES
The scope of Article 2, and of the U.C.C., reflects decisions of
policy, not theoretical purity. The choices made during the draft-
ing of Article 2 in the 1950's about what should and should not
be included were based on the priorities and the legal-political
environment existing at that time.9 Those practical choices are
no longer fully appropriate; they have already been altered in
several respects during the last decade.10
The drafters chose "goods" as the centerpiece for commercial
contract law in Article 2.1 Many historical reasons supported
their decision. 2 But the consequence of the choice is that the
structure of Article 2 reflects a goods bias and a focus on
sales-a transaction that hinges on tender and delivery of a
tangible item. The goods bias has shaped basic contract law
since before the 1950's and today even extends to analyses of
contracts that do not involve goods." But the emphasis on
goods as the centerpiece of contract law and economic exchange
9. See Grant Gilmore, On the Difficulties of Codifying Commercial Law, 57 YALE
L.J. 1341, 1351-54 (1948).
10. For example, the promulgation of Article 4A on funds transfer and Article 2A
on leases of goods expanded the scope of the U.C.C. On the other hand, one of the
alternatives advocated in revised Article 6 on bulk sales is simply to repeal that
body of law. See U.C.C. art. 6 prefatory note (1990).
11. See U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990) (defining the scope of Article 2 by stating that it
"applies to transactions in goods").
12. See generally Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1342-37 (discussing the history of Eng-
lish commercial law and practice).
13. A similar "goods bias" affects traditional economic planning and international
trade discussions. See KARL P. SAUVANT, INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS IN SERVICES:
THE POLITICS OF TRANSBORDER DATA FLOWS 18-22 (1986).
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reflects an industrial economy that no longer exists. Services,
information, and technology contracts are the driving forces of
modern commerce, while manufacturing moves increasingly
offshore and retail sales are governed by regulatory "consumer"
laws and standard form "contracts.""
Today, Article 2 deals with transactions, primarily sales, of
goods.' 5 Goods are all things movable at the time of identifica-
tion to the contract. 6 Sales are contracts that transfer "title" in
goods in return for an agreed consideration. The definition of
"goods" thus controls the scope of Article 2, while the reference
to sales provides the transactional paradigm on which most Arti-
cle 2 provisions are based. In contrast to this focus on tangibles,
a definition of scope that covers software or similar intangibles
might refer to information, data, technology, intellectual proper-
ty, or software as the subject matter of a license contract. A li-
cense consists of a conditional grant of an ongoing right to use,
make, access, modify, or otherwise employ the intangibles with-
out infringing the licensor's rights in them. The paradigm called
into play by this focus differs materially from a sale.
In revising Article 2 for the first time since the 1950's, the
drafters face a choice about the future of the U.C.C. and Article
2. Should this "commercial code" continue to deal solely with
transactions (sales) in goods or should it seek to retain center
stage in commercial law? The answer requires recognition that
the modern world economy is not the world of the 1950's; there
have been fundamental changes in how value is created and ex-
changed." It also involves a judgment about the relationship
between codes and common law. Incorporating an area into the
U.C.C. reduces the scope of common law as to that area. To ar-
14. See Henry T. Greely, Contracts as Commodities: The Influence of Secondary
Purchasers on the Form of Contracts, 42 VAND. L. REV. 133, 140-58 (1989).
15. U.C.C. § 2-102 (1990).
16. Id. § 2-105(1)-(2); see also Herman v. Bonanza Bldg., Inc., 390 N.W.2d 539,
543 (Neb. 1986).
17. U.C.C. § 2-106(1) (1990); see also Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248, 254
(6th Cir. 1981).
18. See DONALD A. MARCHAND & FOREST W. HORTON, INFOTRENDS: PROFITING
FROM YOUR INFORMATION RESOURCES 19 (1986) ("While we have been living with the
consequences of the information economy for many years, our understanding of these
shifts in human events has lagged behind the reality.").
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gue that codification is not appropriate is to argue that common
law should govern.
A. Are "Intangibles" Goods?
This is the wrong question.
The issue is not whether software or other intangibles consti-
tute goods or whether a contract that licenses use of intangibles
constitutes a sale. That question has been discussed in the liter-
ature and in case law, but has little relevance in a law revision.
If one decides to bring some or all intangibles contracts into
Article 2, the statute can address the issue of how to deal with
licenses and software directly. The question of whether intan-
gibles constitute "goods" is secondary. The term "goods" is a
functional term intended to yield a particular result on the scope
of Article 2. If the scope should change, one simply can define
intangibles as goods or, more appropriately, expand Article 2 to
cover not only goods, but also licenses of intangibles.
The question of whether the current Article 2 covers trans-
actions in intangible property has been litigated frequently. 9
The result has been a series of relatively fuzzy lines and uncer-
tainty. The litigation frequently yields a conclusion that places
many intangibles transactions within an Article 2 framework
designed for the sale of goods.
Most courts apply Article 2 to distributorship arrange-
ments.21 In some of these cases, the transferor sells products
19. See, e.g., Glover Sch. & Office Equip. Co. v. Dave Hall, Inc., 372 A.2d 221
(Del. Super. Ct. 1977) (holding that when a cause of action involves both goods and
services, the factual circumstances surrounding the transaction must be looked at to
determine if Article 2 applies); Helvey v. Wabash County REMC, 278 N.E.2d 608
(Ind. Ct. App. 1972) (finding that intangibles are not within the scope of the U.C.C.);
Whitmer v. Bell Tel. Co., 522 A.2d 584 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding that the term
"goods" covers only tangible, movable property).
20. See, e.g., Hudson v. Town and Country True Value Hardware, Inc., 66 S.W.2d
51, 57 (Tenn. 1984) (stating a view toward the reasonable totality of the circum-
stances should control and this usually means broadening the definition of what is
covered as "goods").
21. See, e.g., Monetti, S.P.A. v. Anchor Hocking Corp., 931 F.2d 1178, 1179, 1182-
83 (7th Cir. 1991); Intercorp, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 877 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir.
1989); see also Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1374-75 (Mass. 1980)
(selective application of Article 2).
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that are resold by the transferee under a license.22 Courts apply
a "predominant purpose" test and often conclude that the goods
component predominates as the transactional focus over intangi-
bles such as the right to use trade names, trademarks, customer
lists, copyrights, and similar property.' The transactions do
not always involve goods manufactured by the transferor, how-
ever.
In In re Amica, Inc.,24 Arnica agreed to modify an existing
software product and to transfer to "BB all its rights, title and
interest to the Program and its documentation including copy-
right in the programs... and all trademarks."25 The contract
called for royalty payments based on sales of copies of the pro-
gram to third parties.26 The right to make copies was trans-
ferred. This is a conveyance of a copyright or a license to use
copyrighted material.' This contract established a distributor-
ship through an assignment of a copyright, but the court treated
the transaction as a sale of goods applying Article 2 title con-
cepts.2" In contrast, the court in Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd.,29
held that a contract in which the transferee received designs,
technical drawings, and professional advice along with a right to
use a process for converting solid zinc metal into zinc dust was a
service contract."0 Based on this conclusion, the court held that
no liability for wrongful death arose when an employee was in-
jured in a plant operated by a third party under license from the
defendant."'
22. Monetti, 931 F.2d at 1183.
23. Intercorp, 877 F.2d at 1527.
24. 135 B.R. 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992). Interestingly, although intellectual prop-
erty lawyers and business owners might have difficulty distinguishing the two set-
tings, results such as that in Amica need to be contrasted to decisions reached by
courts in cases involving publishing contracts that may be pure services or intangi-
bles contracts under U.C.C. practice. See Mallin v. University of Miami, 354 So. 2d
1227 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); cf. Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670
(3d Cir. 1991) (finding a software distribution contract within Article 2).
25. Amica, 135 B.R. at 543.
26. Id. at 539.
27. Id. at 542.
28. Id. at 545-46.
29. 772 F. Supp. 244 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
30. Id. at 252-53.
31. Id. at 256.
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What the court in Snyder described as a services contract
would be described by most practitioners as a trade secret li-
cense." The operator obtained the right and the capability to
employ a technology. This is much like the party in Amica which
contracted to obtain the right and the capability to use a copy-
righted program. Beyond the distinction between goods and
other sources of value, the court's analysis in Snyder reflects a
tendency, prevalent in commercial law settings, to disregard the
independent value of the intangible property in a commercial
transaction, assuming that value lies either in tangible items or
in services."
Article 2 scope questions are often litigated in contracts to
transfer rights in computer software. Although some contrary
authority exists, 34 most cases hold that software licenses fall
within Article 2 despite the fact that software is licensed, not
sold, and the value involved resides not in the tangible item on
which the software is recorded, but in the software and the right
32. RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY $ 3.0712][b] (2d ed.
1992).
33. See Snyder, 772 F. Supp. at 252-53. Compare the case in which, in the sale of
a business, the parties themselves identify separate costs for tangibles and intangi-
bles. Faced with a direct recognition that the intangibles constitute separate value,
courts apply a more discriminating predominant purpose test. See Cianbro Corp. v.
Curran-Lavoie, 814 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that the sale of a business consti-
tutes the sale of goods); Fink v. DeClassis, 745 F. Supp. 509 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (finding
the sale of a business not to be the sale of goods).
34. For cases excluding intangibles from Article 2, see Computer Servicenters, Inc.
v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653, 655 (D.S.C. 1970) (data processing contract),
affd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971); Wharton Management Group v. Sigma Consul-
tants, Inc., No. C.A. 89C-JA-165, 1990 WL 18360, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29,
1990) (services contract because "[the] means of transmission is not the object of the
agreement"), affd, 582 A.2d 936 (Del. 1990); Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. LH
Smith Oil Corp;, 492 N.E.2d 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (software development);
Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States Telecommunications & Info. Sys., Inc., 788
S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (telecommunications hardware and design services a
contract for services); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988) (development contract).
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to use that software.35 One court captured the general tone of
the case law in the following language:
Computer programs are the product of an intellectual pro-
cess, but once implanted in a medium are widely distributed
to computer owners .... That a computer program may be
copyrightable ... does not alter the fact that once in the form
of a floppy disc or other medium, the program is tangible,
movable and available in the marketplace.36
Courts often apply Article 2 based on a recognition that a
decision to treat a transaction as outside of Article 2 would leave
the commercial deal subject to uncodified common law rules.7
Common law provides scant guidance to commercial parties,
while even an inappropriate use of sales law at least draws rules
from a commercial source.
Quite clearly, however, the quoted language above cannot be
squared with that "pragmatic" result. It treats software as a
"good" and a "license" as a sale. While a diskette, tape, or other
tangible property may be used to make software available to the
end user, that tangible property becomes irrelevant shortly after
the software is "loaded" into a computer in which it will be used.
The act of loading (transferring) the software into the computer
must be licensed, as must the subsequent acts involved in using
the software. Each action results in the making of an additional
copy of a copyrighted work that would violate the property
rights of the licensor in that work unless the user held a license
to do so. 38 This license will either be explicit in the contract of
35. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir.
1991); Advent Sys. Ltd. v. Unisys Corp., 925 F.2d 670 (3d Cir. 1991); Hospital Com-
puter Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1992); Amica, 135
B.R. 534; Neilson Business Equip. Ctr., Inc. v. Italo Monteleone, M.D., P.A., 524
A.2d 1172 (Del. 1987); Photo Copy, Inc. v. Software, Inc., 510 So. 2d 1337 (La. Ct.
App. 1987); USM Corp. v. Arthur Little Sys., Inc., 546 N.E.2d 888 (Mass. App. Ct.
1989); Drier Co. v. Unitronix Corp., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 1728 (N.J.
Super. App. Div. 1987); Schroders, Inc. v. Hogan Sys., Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 404 (Sup.
Ct. 1987); Communications Groups, Inc. v. Warner Communications, Inc., 527
N.Y.S.2d 341 (Civ. Ct. 1988).
36. Advent Sys., 925 F.2d at 675.
37. See Caspary v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co., 707 F.2d 785, 795 (4th Cir.
1983); Dixie Bonded Warehouse & Grain Co. v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 775 F. Supp.
1543, 1552 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
38. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
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the parties (the license) or implicit in the fact that the licensor
sold the initial copy to the licensee. In either event, the initial
diskette is not relevant; it can be discarded or retained without
impairing the use of the software." Indeed, in many transac-
tions, no diskette or tape is ever transferred; the software is
simply made available to the licensee by remote electronic access
to the licensor's computer.40
Most decisions dealing with software under current law ask
whether the predominant purpose of the transaction was to ac-
quire "goods" or, as an alternative, to obtain "services" or other
intangibles.4 Current case law splits in transactions involving
custom developed software and those involving data processing
contracts for remote processing.42 Some courts emphasize that
the "product" as delivered is goods; others focus on the fact of
extensive services, skill, and effort as the key to the transac-
tion.43 The dispute has significance in what warranties apply to
(holding that the transfer of software from storage to memory as an ordinary part of
use of the software constitutes the making of a new copy which, if not licensed, in-
fringes the software copyright). For cases in which a transferee buys a copy of the
software, federal law grants several rights to the owner of the copy, including the
right to make an additional copy essential to its use of the program. See 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (1988).
39. This scenario is true in the ordinary "home" use of word processing and simi-
lar programs and it is ordinarily true in commercial licensing. For example, although
it involved the sale of a copyright, this would certainly be true under the facts in
Amica, which, as we have seen, involved a royalty based transfer of rights to repro-
duce and sell copies of a computer program. Amica, 135 B.R. at 539.
40. See, e.g., Hospital Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp.
1351 (D.N.J. 1992).
41. See Arlington Elec. Constr. v. Schindler Elevator Corp., No. L-91-102, 1992 WL
43112, at *5 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 6, 1992); Systems Design & Management Info.,
Inc. v. Kansas City Post Office Employees Credit Union, 788 P.2d 878, 879 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1990); Highland Rim Constructors v. Atlantic Software Corp., No. 01-A-01-
9104CV00147, 1992 WL 184872, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 1992).
42. Nimmer et al., supra note 8, at 294.
43. See Hospital Computer Sys., 788 F. Supp. 1351 (remote use is goods); Amica,
135 B.R. 534; Herbert Friedman & Assocs., Inc. v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., No. 85 C-
6503, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15239 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 19, 1989) (goods); Austin's of
Monroe, Inc. v. Brown, 474 So. 2d 1383 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (goods); USM Corp., 546
N.E.2d 888; Communications Groups, Inc., 527 N.Y.S.2d 341 (goods); Camara v. Hill,
596 A.2d 349 (Vt. 1991). But cf Wharton Management Group v. Sigma Consultants,
Inc., No. CA. 89C-JA-165, 1990 WL 18360 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1990), affd, 582
A.2d 936 (Del. 1990); Data Processing Servs., Inc. v. LH Smith Oil Corp., 492
N.E.2d 1329 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986) (not goods); Geotech Energy Corp. v. Gulf States
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a contract, how to compute damages, what limitations periods
apply, and how "perfect" the performance of the program devel-
oper must be."
These issues in software transactions reflect a broader dispute
about what law applies to design contracts of all types, but the
basis on which cases are decided is especially obscure in the con-
text of software because the intangibles have characteristics of
both pure intangibles and goods.45 The lines drawn are unpre-
dictable because the licensee's goal is both to obtain rights to
use software and to receive a product that performs a useful
function.
Data processing cases also present classification issues at
least where the data processing company modifies software to
service a particular client.4' For example, in Colonial Life In-
surance Co. of America v. Electronic Data Systems Corp.,4 the
court held that a contract providing for over four years of data
processing and software development and modification services
was within Article 2.4' The contract involved a promise by Elec-
tronic Data Systems (EDS) to develop software (entitled the
"Insurance Machine") and provide data processing services.49
The court observed that a data processing contract is, in fact,
neither a pure goods nor a pure services contract: "It is an enter-
prise that involves a combination of personal skills and labor,
materials, equipment and time."" In characterizing the con-
tract, the court emphasized that the transaction provided the
end user with access to and use of software. 1 "Although the
Telecommunications & Info. Sys., Inc., 788 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990); Micro-
Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (services).
44. Compare USM Corp., 546 N.E.2d 888 (finding software to be goods and there-
fore subject to Article 2) with Micro-Managers, Inc., 434 N.W.2d 97 (finding software
to be services and therefore outside the scope of Article 2).
45. See Milau Assocs., Inc. v. North Avenue Dev. Corp., 398 N.Y.S.2d 882, 884-85
(1977).
46. Compare Hospital Computer Sys., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1351 (goods) with Com-
puter Servicenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 (D.S.C. 1970) (ser-
vices), affd, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971).
47. 817 F. Supp. 235 (D.N.H. 1993).
48. Id. at 238.
49. Id. at 237.
50. Id. at 238.
51. Id. at 239.
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Agreement did contemplate many years of servicing, the purpose
or thrust of these services was support of EDS' product.., in
accommodating Chubb's business practices."52
The transaction in Colonial Life was clearly not a sale, but a
license. The court recognized this, but found that inclusion in
Article 2 was appropriate and that both remedy limitations rules
and warranty disclaimers from Article 2 applied.53 This, in ef-
fect, created the legal fiction of a sale that took four years after
delivery to complete.
The increasing relevance of intangibles as commercial prod-
ucts presents this same issue in other settings. For example, the
court in Snyder employed a classification analysis to determine
whether a licensor had responsibility to third parties in circum-
stances resembling a products liability claim.54 Federal courts
of appeals have held that a chart or air travel map for guiding
aircraft pilots was a product; strict liability was appropriate.55
In contrast, the court in Rosenstein v. Standard and Poor's
Corp.51 treated a license requiring Standard and Poor's (S&P)
to provide index figures for the daily closing of options prices
based on the S&P index as an information contract.57 When the
data proved to be inaccurate, the court used principles of negli-
gent misrepresentation, rather than U.C.C. warranty rules to
gauge liability.58 The court held that negligent misrepresenta-
tion law applied even though Illinois law holds that this tort
does not lie against the seller of goods. 59 The court reasoned
that while "S & P Indexes have been considered salable prod-
ucts, we do not believe that it sheds its character as information
used to guide the economic destinies of others" covered by the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 242-44.
54. Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 244, 251-52 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
55. See Brockelsby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294-95 (9th Cir. 1985);
Saloomey v. Jeppeson & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1983); Aetna Casualty &
Sur. Co. v. Jeppeson & Co., 642 F.2d 339, 342-43 (9th Cir. 1981).
56. No. 1-91-3000, 1993 WL 176532 (Il1. App. Ct. May 26, 1993).
57. Id. at *2.
58. Id. at *5.
59. Id. at *6.
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applicable tort law.60 In this case, the license contained a dis-
claimer that negated liability for S&P."
These cases have one thing in common. They reach substan-
tively important decisions based on a classification that hinges
on whether the court believed that the most important aspect of
a commercial deal involved tangibles or intangibles or whether
intangibles are products. Today, these questions are asked in an
environment in which information, software, and other intangi-
bles increasingly are regarded as valuable commodities in com-
mercial practice. Yet, modern law mandates that if the intangi-
bles dominate the contract, the commercial relationship is gov-
erned under common law, rather than under commercial codifi-
cation.
Ideally, a court's choice of characterizations is based on a rea-
soned assessment of the equity or policy relevance of applying
either common law or the U.C.C. to the transaction. Yet, this
type of textured analysis does not always appear in court opin-
ions. Even if it does, the guidance left for subsequent parties in
similar transactions is minimal. The definition of "goods" and of
"sale" are not reliable bases on which to gauge the law applica-
ble to a major segment of modern commerce. Nor need we con-
tinue to do so. In a law reform, the issue is not whether or not
software, information, or data processing constitute goods. That
question changes into a more relevant inquiry: how should con-
tracts involving licenses of intangibles be dealt with in the
U.C.C.?
B. Codification as a Process
Software and related intangibles licensing constitute a major
commercial enterprise whose contracts should be brought within
relevant, tailored commercial law. Codification, both as a process
and in the product it yields, -offers advantages that cannot be
replicated through "common law" development of contract princi-
ples.
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. at *5.
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Even before one makes that point, however, the argument
that Article 2 revision should address intangibles contracts be-
gins with an even more simple premise. Many such transactions
are already within the ambit of Article 2; others are subjected to
Article 2 law by analogy. Article 2 revision will affect software
and related licensing because these contracts are governed by
Article 2 principles already.
The issue of whether Article 2 should be expanded beyond
software licenses poses a fundamental question about one's faith
in either common law or codification as a preferred method to
develop commercial contract law. If this question were addressed
to lawyers in the 1880's, longstanding traditions of this country
might have reflected a founded preference for common law de-
velopment as a dominant approach. Yet, more recent history
indicates to the contrary; many aspects of current contract law
already are codified. The modem trend is to expand codification.
Many reasons support this trend. The most important lie in
the pace and character of modern commercial law practice. Com-
mon law development is best suited to a slower pace and to
developing law in reference to transactions that have local flavor
and are characterized by shared expertise among the contracting
parties. This was the commercial world of the 1700's and 1800's.
Today, local transactions among limited groups of knowledgeable
experts still occur, but modem technology and modern commerce
have created a far less homogenous environment. In this setting,
a premium exists on accessible, commercially relevant, and un-
derstandable principles that guide the transaction. Such princi-
ples reduce the effects of asymmetrical knowledge. They make
the underlying rules of the game more readily accessible and fit
those rules to common expectations. The alternative of common
law rules is far less accessible and relevant. It sets a stage that
requires substantial resources devoted to the search for underly-
ing principles in each transaction. Uncertainty imposes costs on
the contracting process and creates unintended error and
inadvertant distribution of values.
Pure common law development is relatively slow and always
disjointed because it evolves commercial contract principles by
scattered court decisions. It often fails to provide sufficient guid-
ance until after the need for it has passed. Furthermore, com-
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mon law development is more attuned to the resolution of indi-
vidual disputes in particular factual contexts than to deriving
general norms or guideposts for national practice. The data and
insights a court uses to solve a litigated matter come from other
courts and from the litigators. They are framed to fit positions in
a case rather than to discern general principles of commercial
practice.
Against this background, I view codification as a process. The
benefits of codification lie in the process itself and in the form of
the product it produces, rather than in a particular substantive
outcome that can be predicted at the outset. The substantive
rules become pertinent only at the end of the process when a
proposed product is submitted for enactment. In fact, substan-
tive rules are dictated by the politics and the open dialogue that
drives the codification forward, rather than by preset assump-
tions about what rules should govern a given commercial con-
text.6" The open dialogue that characterizes modern codification
is a major contribution because it enables diverse viewpoints
and insights to be brought together divorced from particular dis-
putes. While that open process may not always yield commer-
cially beneficial results, it is more attuned to doing so than is
the process of litigation in scattered courtrooms around the
country.
C. Contracts and Behavior
Contract law is a practical legal discipline. It contemplates an
impact on the behavior of contracting parties.63 We evaluate
contract law rules largely based on their supposed impact on the
contracting process. As that suggests, the case for or against
codification of commercial license contracts must be based in
part on an analysis of whether favorable effects on modern com-
mercial contracting practices are more or less likely to be at-
tained in codification than by common law development. To
explore this question, we need at least a preliminary under-
62. See Marianne B. Culhane, The UCC Revision Process: Legislation You Should
See in the Making, 26 CREIGHTON L. REV. 19 (1992).
63. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5; Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargaining
and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990).
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standing of the actual relationship between contract law and
contract practice.
The lively jurisprudence of modern contract law contains a
number of competing perspectives on the role of courts, codes,
and contracting.' In modern legal literature, these descriptions
entail conflicting theoretical formulations. Each posits a differ-
ent relationship between law and contract practice. For example,
a sociological view tends to emphasize the impact of extralegal
factors on behavior, defining pure legal rules as a secondary con-
sideration.65 In contrast, law and economics analyses of con-
tract doctrine assume rational decisionmaking that, along with
strategic factors, strongly accounts for different legal norms in
establishing a contract.66
In fact, the relationship between contract law and contract
practice is not understood and this lack of understanding is cen-
tral in either codification or common law development. There is
little empirical evidence about contracting behavior;" most
structured theoretical discussion posits a highly artificial envi-
ronment that yields little insight into what actually occurs in
the more complex world of human and corporate interaction. The
vagaries and character of human behavior affected by contract
64. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling
Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.
87, 94 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Randy E. Barnett, A Con-
sent Theory of Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269 (1986); David Charny, Hypothetical
Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1815
(1991); Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promis-
ing, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 489 (1989); Richard A. Epstein, Beyond Foreseeability: Conse-
quential Damages in the Law of Contract, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 105 (1989); Charles J.
Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interac-
tions Between Express and Implied Contract Term, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985);
Johnston, supra note 63; Peter Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Rela-
tional Approach, 1988 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 139; Stewart Macauley, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Ian R.
Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CoRNELL L.Q. 495 (1962); Rob-
ert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J.
LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
65. See, e.g., Macauley, supra note 64, at 62-64.
66. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 64, at 94.
67. For a recent effort to obtain information about contracting policy and practice
through a survey questionaire, see Russell J. Weintraub, A Survey of Contract Prac-
tice and Policy, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 1.
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law and strategic and economic considerations create a complex
matrix in even the most seemingly simple contexts.68
Many commercial contracts result from detailed negotiations
and complex drafts. Contract terms control most issues. The role
of contract law in these transactions is indirect. Contract law
provides background rules that apply in the absence of
agreement and may serve as a framework for negotiation. These
background rules provide a bargaining point in negotiated con-
tracts, indicate what language and formats lead to particular re-
sults, and insure against the inability of the parties to explicate
fully the terms of their relationship by providing presumptive
terms that apply in the absence of agreement to the contrary. 9
While this describes one possible role of contract law, the rela-
tive strength of law as contrasted to other more tangible factors
such as market power, bargaining strategy, cost, and timing con-
siderations remains largely unknown. One illustration involves
the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale." Law and economics scholars
typically treat the rule in Hadley as one that sharply limits the
liability of a promisor for consequential damages in the event of
breach." This is a "default" rule for which the parties can con-
tract a different result. Some authors have justified this rule as
a "penalty" or an "information forcing" rule that supposedly
forces a promisee concerned about a risk of extensive consequen-
tial loss in the event of breach to signal that concern and to bar-
gain for contract terms that make the promisor account for this
concern." Arguably, this allows the promisor to take a proper
level of precaution in return for a higher price.
While this incentive may exist, competing strategic consider-
ations may offset it. Furthermore, strategic considerations that
focus on obtaining a better "bargain" are more immediate and
direct in the contracting party's contemplation than concerns
68. See, e.g., Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 733.
69. See id. at 730.
70. 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
71. See Johnston, supra note 63, at 616.
72. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 64, at 91; John C. Coffee Jr.,
The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1623 (1989); Scott, supra note 64, at 609.
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about which rule would apply in the event of nonperformance,
large loss, and resulting litigation. As Jason Johnston notes,
if we are talking about bargaining over the contract, then we
are talking about a process of strategic information
transmission, a process in which the promisee tries to per-
suade the promisor that she cannot pay a high price, and the
promisor tries to persuade the promisee that she should. In
this process, the promisee would generally want to convince
the promisor that her value from performance is low. . .. "
The promisee would not desire to communicate that nonperfor-
mance may inflict large loss. The world of commercial contract-
ing is complex. What actually occurs in reference to consequen-
tial loss or other default rules must be filtered through an un-
derstanding of that complexity and the uncertainty of prediction
that it creates.
But in the complex world of commercial contracting, there is a
competing, parallel reality that is much different from the idea
of fully bargained contracts. Some contracts involve complex and
lengthy negotiations, but detailed negotiations are not the norm.
Lengthy negotiation consumes money and time, often creates
conflict, and may result in deals being hindered, rather than
facilitated.74 Most contracts cannot sustain the overhead re-
quired by such negotiation; the reality is that many commercial
contracts entail little negotiation. These less negotiated con-
tracts rely on background law to fill out the details of the rela-
tionship so that in the event of a dispute, the background rules
rather than express terms of the contract will bind the par-
ties."' It is not clear that the parties expressly consider these
background rules. They may not seriously consider the risk of a
73. Johnston, supra note 63, at 616-17.
74. Many business owners view the role of lawyers in such "exquisite" negotiations
as inhibiting, rather than expediting, agreement. One scholar has noted that "[a]t
worst, lawyers are seen as deal killers whose continual raising of obstacles, without
commensurate effort at finding solutions, ultimately causes transactions to collapse
under their own weight. Lawyers, to be sure, do not share these harsh evaluations
of their role." Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills
and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 242 (1984).
75. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 64 (noting the value of implied terms as widely
useful in that they reduce certain types of errors).
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breach and actual litigation in most cases. If the parties do con-
sider the risk that a dispute may arise, default rules must pro-
vide a realistic gauge of their expectations about the contract.
D. Contractual Flexibility
In this complex environment, two assumptions should under-
lie substantive commercial contract law, both of which are more
likely to be fostered in codification than in common law. The
first is that contract law should preserve the freedom of contract
principle where the issues affect only the immediate parties to
the transaction."
The idea of flexibility in commercial contracting is so embed-
ded in our contract law theory that many analyses of contract
doctrine simply assume that contractual flexibility is a basic
norm and then proceed to ask what shaping, facilitating, or con-
straining influences should be applied to a principle of party
autonomy in order to mold results consistent with general eco-
nomic or social policy.77
From the perspective of a theory that posits consent of the
parties as the basis for a legal principle that enforces contrac-
tual promises, the concept of contractual flexibility to choose
terms represents a direct extension of the consent principle."
In essence, as a society we enforce contracts because they rep-
resent consensual undertakings. The ability of the parties to
define their own undertaking constitutes a core aspect of the
consensual nature of the relationship itself.79
76. For example, the comments to Article 2A note:
This codification was greatly influenced by the fundamental tenet of...
freedom of the parties to contract . . . . [Like all other Articles of this
Act, the principles of construction and interpretation contained in Article
1 are applicable . . . . These principles include the ability of the parties
to vary the effect of the provisions of Article 2A, subject to certain limi-
tations including those that relate to the obligations of good faith, dili-
gence, reasonableness and care.
U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1990) (Relationship of Article 2A to Other Articles).
77. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 63, at 615-20 (discussing bargaining incentives
and the rule in Hadley v. Baxendale).
78. See Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and Contractual
Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 826-27 (1992).
79. See generally Barnett, supra note 64.
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A perspective that focuses more on the role of contract in es-
tablishing optimal trade relationships supports contractual flexi-
bility on the basis that individuals respond to their actual situa-
tion in a way that cannot be replicated by general contract
law.8" The parties' preferences reflect a more focused assess-
ment of their actual circumstances than mandatory rules adopt-
ed by the State. "[Clontracting parties will often prefer different
contractual provisions... [and] contractual flexibility can there-
fore increase the total gains from trade."8' Facilitating parties'
ability to define and enforce their preferences promotes more
optimal commercial relationships even though individual con-
tracts may deviate wildly from the optimum because of market
factors and information and skill level differences.
The emphasis on flexibility leads to a preference for contract
law that establishes background rules that serve a default or
gap-filling function in a commercial relationship. 2 A default
rule should, mesh with expected or conventional practice in a
manner that projects a favorable impact on contracting, as
judged by relevant policy goals. The rule can be varied by agree-
ment of the contracting parties. 3 This contrasts with an ap-
proach that favors rules that dictate terms and regulate com-
mercial behavior. As a matter of practice, default rules are most
common in commercial contexts, while consumer law contains
many mandatory rules designed to protect the consumer against
mercantile overreaching."
Contractual flexibility should not be confused with the idea of
open-textured interpretation. Contractual freedom refers to the
ability of the parties to define their own relationship.85 Open-
textured interpretation refers to the ability in law of a court to
refer to material outside the contract to provide explanation or
80. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 735-37.
81. Id. at 734.
82. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 64.
83. Id.
84. See id&; see also Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution:
The Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MIcH. L. REV. 683, 688 n.15 (1993)
(noting that tort rules are usually immutable).
85. See generally Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18
J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975) (discussing the principle of freedom of contract).
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meaning to the contract.8 This latter view creates contract as
context.17 The concept is that contextual interpretation of a con-
tract more accurately reflects the actual intent of the parties in
all cases.8" For example, a prior course of dealing creates a
common basis of understanding for "interpreting [the parties']
expressions and other conduct." 9 Where clear signals in the
contract or the context demonstrate that the parties intend to
rely on express terms, these terms should control. It is a famil-
iar rule that express contract terms trump terms implied from
course of dealing,0 while a contract intended to be the exclu-
sive statement of the parties' bargain excludes contradictory
parol evidence.9
As this shows, the idea of using context to interpret contract
terms relates to a belief that the context enables a court to un-
derstand what the parties meant in their agreement. Yet, the
context may be more important than this theory suggests; in
some cases, it serves as a basis to regulate contracting practice
and to shape outcomes of disputes. Professors Goetz and Scott
describe an unwillingness by some courts to accept tailored con-
tract terms as a contractual step away from implied terms.9
That unwillingness is seen regularly in opinions dealing with
parol evidence and merger clauses that argue that a court
should disregard the context in favor of the written contract."
86. Cf Steven R. Greenberger, Justice Scalia's Due Process Traditionalism Applied
to Territorial Jurisdiction: The Illusion of Adjudication Without Judgment, 33 B.C. L.
REv. 981, 988 n.25 (1992) (discussing the nature of an "open-textured" constitutional
provision).
87. Although often assumed to be the dominant approach to contract law, there is
in fact a split in modem case law as to what extent the context should be employed
in adding terms and qualifying meanings in commercial contracts. The contextual
emphasis dates from the 1950's when the U.C.C., "now joined by the Second Re-
statement of Contracts, effectively reverse[d] the common law presumption ....
Evidence derived from experience and practice can now trigger the incorporation of
additional, implied terms." Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 274.
88. See id. at 281.
89. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 223(1) (1979); see also U.C.C. § 1-
205(1) (1990) (employing the same language).
90. U.C.C. §§ 1-205(4), 2-208(2) (1990); see also Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at
281.
91. U.C.C. § 2-202 (1990).
92. Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 263.
93. See, e.g., Hayward v. Postma, 188 N.W.2d 31, 33 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (hold-
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It is also present in both the U.C.C. and the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts.' For example, comment 2 to U.C.C. section
2-202 notes that written contracts
are to be read on the assumption that the course of prior
dealings between the parties and the usages of the trade
were taken for granted when the document was phrased.
Unless carefully negated they have become an element of the
meaning of the words used.95
Similarly, under the U.C.C., a contract remedy provision does
not replace the statutory remedies unless the parties expressly
agreed that the contract remedy is the sole and exclusive reme-
dy for a breach. 6 As this indicates, some default rules, in order
to be negated, must be carefully excluded or altered.97 The pre-
sumption is that the default rules apply." The onus is on the
parties to negate that presumption.99
As this illustrates, the idea of contractual flexibility is a core
premise of modern contract law, but that premise does not sup-
port unlimited and unrestricted freedom to set contract terms.
There are restraints and contextual frameworks. For our pur-
poses, we must ask whether a proper blend will be achieved best
ing that parties must use clear and unequivocal language to shift liability for risk of
loss from seller to buyer).
94. See U.C.C. § 2-202 (1990); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 220, 222,
223 (1979).
95. U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1990) (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 2-719(1)(b).
97. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 274.
98. See id.
99. See id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (1990). The emphasis on context as a
source of meaning for a contract derives from a preference for judicial flexibility in
reinterpreting and enforcing, or refusing to enforce, a contract. In its simplest form,
this reflects a conflict between litigators and contract drafters. Open-textured rules
allow courts to "do justice" in the dispute presented to them. Ultimately, this em-
phasizes the role of litigation in commercial contract. The open-textured perspective
contrasts with a perspective that argues for an ability to predict the outcome of
adopting a particular form or contract term. This view presumes that the main focus
of contract doctrine centers on contracting, rather than litigating. The view argues
for certainty in contracting in the sense that contracted-for outcomes should not be
altered in litigation. It has its greatest persuasive force in cases where parties actu-
ally negotiate and draft tailored terms of agreement.
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in a codification or in common law development of contract prin-
ciples.
E. Commercial Facilitation
Before discussing this issue, we need to look at the second
major assumption in commercial contract law: that the proper
goal of contract law is to facilitate commercial contract
practice,' 0 rather than to regulate it.' This idea provides a
relatively universal foundation for law pertaining to commercial
contracting, but how one develops criteria for determining what
rules will best facilitate contracting practice is a matter of active
dispute.' 2 The various positions on these issues turn on what
philosophical premise one brings to the analysis and on what
behavioral model one bases a discussion of contracting. All of the
positions suffer from a fundamental failure of knowledge; as
shown earlier, we know little about the actual interaction be-
tween contract law and contract practice.
In this context, the best source of substantive contract default
rules lies not in a theoretical model, but in a reference to com-
mercial and trade practices. This is not simple faith in empirical
over normative sources for commercial law. Rather, it stems
from the reality that, even though we may not know how law
interacts with contract practice, decisions about contract law in
a codification or in common law will continue to be made. Unless
countervailing policy concerns clearly appear, we should make
those decisions by reference to sources that reflect an accumula-
tion of practical choices made in actual transactions.
100. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 733; Charny, supra note 64, at 1823-24;
Craswell, supra note 64, at 503-05; Johnston, supra note 63, at 615-18.
101. Adherence to this view, of course, disintegrates as one moves away from pure
commercial contracting to contracts that involve consumer or other protected interest
groups or as the contract terms alter the rights or positions of third parties not
involved in the agreement. In the less commercial environments or the third party
settings, contract law used as a regulatory mechanism is more common. In the mod-
em Article 2 revision, this fact of political life presents a question of whether the
same contract law statute simultaneously can support commercial and consumer con-
tract law. Are the two now sufficiently different that at least partial separation is
desirable?
102. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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As Grant Gilmore wrote, "[tihe principal objects of draftsmen
of general commercial legislation... are to be accurate and not
to be original." " Gilmore primarily was referring to contract
rules that remove legal obstacles that hinder existing common
commercial relationships. In essence, he was arguing that a
function of commercial contract law should be to remove or re-
tailor mandatory rules of law that might impede the natural
flow of commercial relationships as gauged by the desired trans-
action patterns of commercial parties. To be accurate and not
original is a goal that refers to commercial practice as an appro-
priate standard for gauging what activities are desirable or to be
fostered as a matter of policy, unless a clearly countervailing
consideration of policy indicates to the contrary, or where the
contractual arrangement injures or threatens injury to third
party interests that social policy desires to protect.
This goal is pertinent to default rules. Indeed, the idea that
default rules should reflect commercial practice has been widely
accepted. For example, one widespread belief about how default
rules assist in facilitating contracting is as follows:
[Tihe law supplies standardized and widely suitable risk allo-
cations which enable parties to take an implied formulation
"off the rack," thus eliminating certain types of costs and
errors arising from individualized specification of terms.
... [Altypical parties are invited to formulate express provi-
sions that redesign or replace ill-fitting implied rules. Thus,
state-supplied terms provide parties with time-tested, rela-
tively safe provisions that minimize the risk of unintended ef-
fects . .. . [while the risk of distortion] can be reduced by
exercising the option to specify ... express terms.'
One suspects that the relationship between the default, or "off-
the-rack," terms and the creation of a contractual relationship is
far more complex. Yet, the concept hinges on default rules that
are standardized and "widely suitable" such that they can be
used frequently without disruption or costly negotiation: a refer-
ence geared at least in part to transactional practice.
Randy Barnett comments:
103. Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1341.
104. Goetz & Scott, supra note 64, at 266.
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First,... default rules [that reflect the conventional or
commonsense understanding existing in the relevant commu-
nity] are likely to reflect the tacit... agreement of the par-
ties and thereby facilitate the social functions of consent.
Second, when parties have asymmetric access to the back-
ground rules of contract, enforcing conventionalist default
rules will reduce subjective disagreements by providing par-
ties who are... informed of the background rules with an
incentive to educate those parties who are ... ignorant of
these rules."°5
From this view, background rules tied to the ordinary commer-
cial behavior tend both to provide a legal base that falls within
the tacit expectations of the parties and to ameliorate problems
caused by asymmetrical knowledge because they supply common
sense outcomes.
For many years, law and economics literature has pursued an
analogous path, although based on a more structured and hypo-
thetical assessment of contract practice.' This literature as-
sumes that the goal of contract law is to promote contracting
efficiency. °7 One branch of that literature further assumes
that in doing so, a proper reference point is to ask what contract
the parties would have entered into in a world without transac-
tion costs.'0 8 This hypothetical contract model builds doctrine
based on assumptions about what parties might do in an artifi-
cial environment, unconstrained and unaffected by costs, market
pressure, strategic considerations, and the other variables that
influence actual contracting. This model avoids the complexities
of actual contracting and enables close analytical study based on
assumptions about how humans might behave in the artificial
environment." 9
105. Barnett, supra note 78, at 829.
106. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 63.
107. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 745.
108. See Charny, supra note 64, at 1820-21; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1433 (1989) (discussing
"costless contracting").
109. Much of this form of analysis, of course, stems from the insights of Ronald
Coase, who proposed that in the absence of transaction costs, consensual arrange-
ments would reach the same end point between contracting parties regardless of the
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Of course, that is both its greatest strength and its greatest
weakness. When one relaxes the artificial assumptions about
costs and lack of strategic considerations, the hypothetical bar-
gain flounders. Choices of default rules under more complex and
realistic assumptions are less clear simply because the context is
far more complex.
[Tihe introduction of transaction costs can actually exacer-
bate the inefficiencies of strategic bargaining.
[Considering] even slight transaction costs will make the
determination of efficient legal rules dramatically more diffi-
cult. [Tihe behavior of contracting parties can change signifi-
cantly in response to extremely small changes in other, more
subtle underlying variables ....
[RIelatively simple contractual settings can give rise to
enormous complexity. While... different default rules...
would be theoretically efficient, our model suggests that there
is small hope that lawmakers will be able to divine the effi-
cient rule in practice."'
Of course, this result flows from sacrificing theoretical purity for
a more complex reality and deals with a more human context,
rather than an entirely abstract model. It is to be expected, even
cherished, since it documents the variety of experience in human
behavior.
Yet one cannot avoid making law for commercial contracts.
Millions of contractual relationships must develop under some
legal structure, while the thousands of litigated contract dis-
putes must be resolved by applying some rule of law. Whether
that law is made in a common law framework, in law review
articles, or in a codification, a legal framework will develop. The
inability to predict theoretically accurate results argues for an
alternative reference point that engages the experiences of those
involved in the commercial practice.
starting position or default rule. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960).
110. Ayres & Gertner, supra note 5, at 733.
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F. Codification as a Method
On judging the relative merits of commercial law codification
as against common law development, we should match the pro-
cess to our primary goals. Two general points define the content
of desirable commercial contract law: (1) it should preserve con-
tract flexibility, and (2) it should provide commercially relevant
background rules tailored to the contractual setting. Experience
does not support a view that common law better sustains con-
tract flexibility or that it provides commercially relevant back-
ground law. Indeed, the nature of the codification process as
contrasted to the common law process indicates that codification
is better suited to achieve both results.
In common law cases, regulation of terms is as common as
support for contractual freedom.' Because a judicial proceed-
ing presents specific disputes for resolution, it focuses on the
contextual fairness of outcome. Today, commercial law courts
disagree about the proper scope of contract freedom."' Many
reported decisions opt to constrain enforcement of contract terms
even in commercial contexts."' The idea that a court (or jury)
should "do justice" often conflicts with the idea that contracting
parties are entitled to enforce their contract. Some courts agree
that "[firms that have negotiated contracts are entitled to en-
force them to the letter,""4 but not all courts accept this."5
The idea that contract flexibility can best be preserved through
the courts ignores the history of commercial law over the past
several decades.
111. See, e.g., Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp., 801 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1991) (plac-
ing common law limitations upon an express acceleration clause); see also ROGER M.
MILGRIM, MILGRiM ON TRADE SEcRETs 3-60 to 3-112 (12 Matthew Bender Business
Organizations Series, Rel. 44, Pub. 738, 1993) (describing reasonableness limitation
placed on restrictive covenants); NIMMER, supra note 32, T 3.10[3] (discussing the
reasonableness limitation placed upon noncompetition clauses).
112. Compare K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752, 759-60 (6th Cir. 1985)
(implying additional terms to a contract so as to avoid unreasonable enforcement)
with Kham & Nate's Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351,
1357 (7th Cir. 1990) (strictly construing the terms of a contract).
113. See, e.g., KM.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 759-60.
114. Kham & Nate's Shoes, 908 F.2d at 1357.
115. See, e.g., Reid v. Key Bank of Southern Maine, Inc., 821 F.2d 9, 13 (1st Cir.
1987); KM.C. Co., 757 F.2d at 759-60.
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Similarly, when a "common law" court creates or applies a
background rule, the extent to which that rule corresponds to
commercial expectations is far from consistent. Whether the rule
corresponds with commercial expectations hinges on the ability
of an individual judge to understand the commercial world as
depicted by conflicting experts or, even worse, as left to the
imagination of the litigators in the case. A tentative and often
awkward relationship exists between judicial opinions and com-
mercial practice. The tentative character of that relationship
cannot be cured in a system of isolated litigation and resolution
of specific disputes.
In contrast, uniform law processes bring together experts and
foster public discussion in a forum that identifies underlying
policy and practice over a relatively extended period of time. The
resulting advantages cannot be minimized, nor can they be repli-
cated in court."6 Both the process and the product provide ben-
efits not present in common law.
The codification process examines commercial practice, com-
mercial law, and contract policy in an open forum over a period
of years during which all interested groups can participate. In
the judicial process, litigants debate specific, disputed issues.
Common law evolves through shared inferences generated by
numerous disputes played out in different courtrooms by differ-
ent litigants. This takes time and ordinarily leaves significant
gaps in reasoning and consistency. In addition, in modern "com-
mon law," judicial rulings go hand in hand with scattered state
statutes. Legislatures respond to local conditions and lobbying. A
national codification is better suited to develop coherent and
commercially relevant standards of contract law because of the
broad-based participation it engenders in a single forum over a
period of time.
The difference in process is most relevant to default rules that
pertain to general aspects of contracts, not context-driven infor-
116. Perhaps one can realize the same advantages in the development of restate-
ments of law. Like uniform law processes, restatements bring together experts and
foster open discussion. Restatements were once primary statements of law in com-
mercial practice. But in a- world of contract governed by statutory principles, the
force of a restatement is questionable and the underlying assumptions, based on the
common law evolution of commercial principles, are suspect.
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mation. Compare the question of what level of carbon content is
subsumed in the phrase "commercial grade steel" with the ques-
tion of whether a software licensor can remotely access and
erase licensed software if the licensee defaults. The first ques-
tion is contextual; it cannot be answered in general terms. It
involves trade use information whose admissibility depends on
substantive rules of contract intepretation. The second question,
on the other hand, defines the general nature of a software li-
cense. Is electronic repossession permissible? That question is
better addressed in a codification process. The judicial process
initially would focus on whether a particular licensor acted in a
permissible manner when it erased particular software. The
litigation would concentrate on the particular contract and the
equities between the individual parties. The court may or may
not receive evidence about the general expectations of licensors
and licensees. It may or may not consider that current Article 2
does not allow for repossession without a security interest. It
may or may not receive information about other types of licens-
es. In the actual case that ruled on this issue, the court held
that erasure was permissible without referring to Article 2 or to
general practice in licensing."' This decision resolved the spe-
cific dispute. A general rule of national scope on which licensors
can rely awaits additional litigation and additional opinions.
The same issue addressed in a codification results in a far
different process and a far different end product. A codified rule
would be developed in a context in which licensor and licensee
representatives participate and comment concerning their expec-
tations, the risks and safeguards that might attend a reposses-
sion right, the contract language that might create or preclude
this option, and any other relevant issues. Participants could
draw on experience not only from software license practices, but
other forms of licensing and experience developed under Article
2A on leases. Upon resolution of the issue, the outcome would
embody a rule of general application for all jurisdictions that
enact the uniform law.
117. American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., 763 F.
Supp. 1473, 1496 (D. Minn. 1991).
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Far better than its common law counterpart, the codification
process is more likely to draw default rules that are uniform
across jurisdictions and appropriate to licensing transactions in
a timeframe and in a form that will facilitate commercial prac-
tice. The product of codification is a document stating basic law.
Because it developed in a national forum, the codification carries
weight that reduces local variance and yields relative consisten-
cy from state to state. Furthermore, the enacted document en-
hances the accessibility of contract law, especially when gauged
by reference to parties that lack the time, resources, or expertise
to engage in extended legal research either for a particular deal
or for general purposes.
In contrast, common law decisions and augmenting statutes
often yield scattered and contradictory rulings that commercial
parties can define and understand only through research and
analysis by legal experts. Local variations are the norm, rather
than the exception. The codification product yields a more
readily discernible and consistent approach to contract issues
than does common law as practiced today. Moreover, the greater
ease of access of uniform codification offers the possibility of
equalizing knowledge about applicable default rules.
G. Codification Criteria
While codification yields advantages not found in common law
development, not all aspects of contract law should be codified.
Codification should be reserved for situations where the area of
contract achieves national scope and substantial commercial vol-
ume. We need to ask whether intangibles licensing fits this de-
scription.
Selectivity, both in subject matter and in content, is a common
characteristic of U.C.C. codification. The basic principle is that
the topic must be of sufficient importance to justify the effort
and of such a character that the area of contract can benefit
from the advantages that the codification process and its result-
ing product yield."' The characteristics that call for codifica-
118. See Gilmore, supra note 9, at 1341; Raymond T. Nimmer, Uniform Codification
of Commercial Contract Law, 18 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 465, 470 (1992).
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tion are present in various forms of commercial intangibles con-
tracting that involve national industries of substantial impor-
tance to modem commerce. Indeed, the information and soft-
ware industries are among the most significant sectors of mod-
ern commerce; moreover, their importance is growing, as is that
of other fields of intangibles contracting. There are three princi-
ples or criteria involved here: the volume principle, the rele-
vance principle, and the national principle.
1. Volume Principle
No effort to codify an area of commercial contract law should
be made unless the topic has sufficient scope to justify the effort
in an era where time and resources are limited."9 Software
and related intangibles contracts clearly fit this criterion.
While this general "volume" principle seems obvious, it is not
applied consistently. Sales of goods and secured transactions
were important in the 1950's and 1960's and remain so today. It
is less clear that bulk sales, investment securities, and domestic
letters of credit were important when included in the U.C.C. 2 °
The U.C.C. excludes contracts for services and transactions in
real estate.121 It cannot be argued that these are less frequent,
less significant, or less commercial than topics encompassed
within the U.C.C.'22
One justification for the recent decision to draft and promul-
gate Article 4A was that funds transfers deal with huge
amounts of money and that "[tihere is no comprehensive body of
law that defines the rights and obligations that arise from wire
transfers."2 ' Yet, transactions covered by Article 4A occur in
narrow economic and commercial strata. Whereas large amounts
of money are transferred, few disputes arise. Relatively few
reported cases deal with funds transfer disputes.'24
119. Scope includes both economic significance and generality of application.
120. Nimmer, supra note 118, at 480.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. U.C.C. art. 4A prefatory note (1990).
124. For example, the UCC Case Digest devotes only 15 pages to reporting Article
4A disputes, whereas Article 5 on letters of credit receives 439 pages of coverage.
[UCC Sections 4-407 to 8-408] UCC Case Dig. (Callaghan) § 4A (1991 & Supp.
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The justification for Article 2A concentrated on the importance
of leasing goods.'25 The value of personal property leases, how-
ever, pales in comparison to software and other intangibles con-
tracts. Litigation about commercial leases was common prior to
Article 2A, but dealt largely with tax law and the intersection
between Article 2 and Article 9.126 Article 2A goes beyond these
issues, dealing with the lease relationship and third party is-
sues.
127
Software and other intangibles contracts fit a standard of im-
portance gauged by economic significance under any measure.
The information industry accounts for over two percent of the
gross national product of this country and affects a broad spec-
trum of commercial and individual interests.28 Ongoing devel-
opments in information technology promise to continue the expo-
nential growth of that field. Technology (intangibles) contracts
underlie virtually all modern areas of commerce driving our
present economy. Virtually every company uses one or more
software products. The copyright and related industries are
burgeoning and depend substantially on intangibles-based trans-
actions.
2. Relevance Principle
In addition to volume, codification should only occur if it will
benefit commercial practice more than continuing reliance on
common law rules. In short, the relevance principle causes one
to ask whether an area of contract would benefit by a process
that supplants common law and a product that contains a cen-
tral statement of legal principles in legislated form. Ordinarily,
the answer is yes in a high volume commercial area unless fed-
eral or other law already has established stable and discernible
contract rules.
1993); id. § 5.
125. U.C.C. § 2A-102 (1990); see also Amelia H. Boss, The History of Article 2A: A
Lesson For Practitioner and Scholar Alike, 39 ALA. L. REV. 575, 576 (1988)
126. See generally Boss, supra note 125, at 579.
127. See generally U.C.C. § 2A-301 (1990) (establishing the rule regarding the en-
forceability of a lease between the contracting parties and with regard to third par-
ties).
128. Nimmer et al., supra note 8, at 293.
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In reference to software and intangibles, federal law defines
property rules for some intangibles under copyright, patent, and
trademark law.'29 Other property rights arise under state
law. 130 The federal statutes specify some principles relevant to
contract law and preempt state law on those issues,13' but fed-
eral law generally cedes coverage of contract principles to state
law. 32 U.C.C. codification addresses state law.
In discussing the rationale for codification of leasing law, the
drafters of the U.C.C. noted that several issues were litigated re-
peatedly in reported cases and that resolving these issues was a
major reason for the codification of lease law.18 But they also
noted that for commercial transactions, law can be uncertain
either because of an inability to reliably predict the outcome or
to readily discern the law.13 The comments to Article 2A state:
There are reasons to codify the law with respect to leases of
goods in addition to those suggested by a review of the re-
ported cases. [For example, a lessee's remedies are impor-
tant,] but that issue is not reached through a review of the
reported cases. This is only one of the many issues presented
in structuring, negotiating and documenting a lease of
goods."
Prior to the growth of the information technologies and the
increasing commercial value of intangibles, a small and closely
related elite controlled intangibles contracting.3 ' Patent and
copyright lawyers formed a small segment of the bar, and they
handled most commercial intangibles contracts.'37 This concen-
129. See EARL W. KINTNER & JACK LAHR, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER
2-5 (1975).
130. Id. at 3.
131. Id. at 3-4.
132. See T.B. Harms Co. v. Eliscu, 339 F.2d 823, 828 (2d Cir. 1964) (discussing the
statutory requirement that claims must "arise out of' the copyright to sustain feder-
al jurisdiction).
133. U.C.C. § 2A-101 (1990) (Rationale for Codification); see also Steven L. Harris,
The Interface Between Articles 2A and 9 Under the Official Text and the California
Amendments, 22 UCC L.J. 99, 99-111 (1989).
134. U.C.C. § 2A-101 (1990) (Rationale for Codification).
135. Id.
136. See Nimmer, supra note 118, at 485.
137. Id.
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tration of expertise reduced the need for contract principles ac-
cessible on a uniform basis because it heightened the localized
knowledge and expectations surrounding intangibles deals. 8'
The emergence of information technology as a fundamental
part of the modern economy and the increasing recognition of
the commercial value of intangibles has changed the identities of
those who deal with intangibles contracts."9 Specifically, these
trends have expanded the number and variety of people and
backgrounds brought to the issue.14° Patent lawyers play a
role, but lawyers and businesses with no patent background now
also handle patent, software, and copyright licensing.' This
reflects the commercialization of intellectual property.
This change heightens the need for codification. It is more
urgent to have contract principles that are accessible and certain
than it may have been when only experts dealt with intangibles
contracts. In a more heterogeneous context, the contract rules
must be accessible to non-experts and non-lawyers. Codified and
uniform contract laws better serve this need than continued reli-
ance on common law traditions.
3. National Principle
An area of contract should be national in scope to warrant
codification. The contracting field and the issues it raises must
impact most states and regions of the country and should be
characterized by national, rather than purely local, participa-
tion.
The national principle focuses on areas of contracting that
would benefit from the accessibility and consistency of legal pre-
138. Indeed, relatively little is written about contract issues pertaining to intellectu-
al property transactions outside of the heavily commercial field of software contract-
ing. The intellectual property bar relied on property law to define rights in both a
contractual and a noncontractual setting. It continues to do so, at least as gauged
by the literature and educational programs. If other law was considered relevant, it
tended to reside in federal antitrust law, which restricts the ability of the rights
owner to do whatever it pleases with the property it controls. A review of a con-
tinuing education program on licensing would show almost no attention to basic con-
tract issues such as damages for breach, statute of frauds, or the like.
139. See Nimmer, supra note 118, at 485.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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mises in a uniform code. Consider what default rule would de-
termine whether delivery of a slightly damaged product breaches
a contract for the commercial sale of a television and contrast it
with what default rule would determine whether a licensee
whose use of a licensed patent exceeds the terms of the license
commits a material breach of the contract. More to the point,
how would a contracting party discover the rule in a particular
state if the transaction crossed state lines? In the television
scenario, Article 2 provides the reference point; the general rule
under the U.C.C. will be similar in most states.' For the li-
cense, the rule is found in state common law. One might search
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts for an answer, but not all
states have adopted the Restatement. The actual answer depends
on local case law. In the license example, codification and uni-
formity would make the basic premise accessible and reasonably
ascertainable on a national basis.
Both bodies of law can be discovered and applied, but codified
rules are more readily accessible and tend to be more uniform.
Each of these benefits has great impact in a contracting area
that spans state lines. Uncodified law in such a case imposes
avoidable costs on contracting. Variations in local law hinder,
rather than facilitate, national operations; eliminating the costs,
therefore, would make a significant contribution. Uniform rules
level the commercial playing field for both large companies that
have the expertise and the resources to undertake a search for
applicable law and small firms that cannot afford to do so.
The national principle does not demand that all transactions
in an area involve national actors. In all areas covered by Arti-
142. U.C.C. § 2-601 (1990). This section adopts the "perfect tender" rule, which is
eroded by exceptions in the Code and in case law. See, e.g., id. § 2-508 (seller's
right to cure); Damashek v. Wang Lab., Inc., 540 N.Y.S.2d 429 (App. Div. 1989)
(noting the importance of instructing the jury to apply the requirements of U.C.C.
§ 2-508).
143. Of course, one can argue that a federal forum is better suited to achieve na-
tional uniformity. See David M. Phillips, Secured Credit and Bankruptcy: A Call for
the Federalization of Personal Property Security Law, 50 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53
(1987). The desirability of federalizing commercial contract law has been debated
since at least the early 1940's. See Robert Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 100 (1951); Symposium, The
Proposed Federal Sales Act, 26 VA. L. REV. 537 (1940).
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cles 2 and 2A, local transactions among local participants pre-
dominate. But a national practice exists in addition to the local
practice, and it would benefit from clarifying and unifying local
law in terms of both accessibility and the elimination of con-
flicts.
Intangibles contracting is an area of commercial contract law
that certainly exists on a national, rather than purely a local,
level. Software licensing occurs between companies located in
different states. Data processing services are no longer tied to
georgaphical locales. Patent, trade secret, and other forms of
intangibles contracting operate at an entirely national level, no
longer linked to exclusively local groups or resources.
III. TAILORED VERSUS GENERAL RULES:
A LICENSE Is NOT A SALE
Whether Article 2 revisions merely cover software contracts or
reach further to encompass other types of intangibles licensing,
how must the structure of Article 2 be examined to accommo-
date intangibles contracts and other forms of commercial con-
tracts? This raises two issues. The first focuses on whether Arti-
cle 2 revisions should make any special adaptations for intangi-
bles contracts in Article 2. Essentially: can a contract law model
developed for the sale of goods fit commercial contract practice
that transfers rights in intangibles? In this part of the Article, I
argue that a simple force-fitting of intangibles licenses into a
contract framework designed for the sale of tangible property
would create significant mismatches, the potential consequences
of which mandate the development of at least some special pro-
visions of contract law for transactions involving intangibles.
The second issue concerns how the special contract provisions
should be developed and promulgated in a revised Article 2. In
Part IV of this Article, I discuss the idea of a hub and spoke
configuration for Article 2 of the U.C.C. This approach distin-
guishes between generally applicable legal principles and spe-
cially tailored rules. "The generally applicable rules could be
applied to sales, leases, licenses, and other commercial contracts
such as services contracts. The general rules provide the hub,
from which spokes branch out to provide special treatment of
substantively unique and important transactions. Such a
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drafting style is common in many codes and blends both growth
potential and fundamental stability. The Article 2 Drafting Com-
mittee adopted this concept as a tentative working policy in
1993 in order to accommodate software and related licensing
transactions, while leaving the framework of Article 2 sufficient-
ly open to deal with continuing changes in commercial prac-
tice.'"
A. Tailoring and Differentiation
Should software and similar intangibles transactions simply
be incorporated into Article 2 without changes in the Article 2
sale of goods model? 45 The Drafting Committee has concluded
that simple incorporation is not appropriate.'
Essentially, the rationale is that sufficiently unique character-
istics of intangibles licenses justify separate treatment of these
contracts in the U.C.C. and not merely incorporation within
sales law. To be effective, a codification must contain rules that
are appropriate and geared to commercial practices. Where the
nature of the subject matter and the commercial practice involv-
ing two types of commercial deals diverge to the extent that only
the most general rule can apply consistently to each, separate
treatment is appropriate. Under this standard of commercial
difference, software and related intangibles transactions qualify
for separate treatment. Licenses are not equivalent to sales of
goods, and various aspects of software transactions require spe-
cial treatment of the license and similar contract relationships.
At least two aspects of an intangibles license differentiate it
from a sale of goods. First, the value transferred to the buyer
lies not in the physical items, but in the functionality of the
information or technology and in the contract right to use the
intangibles. The licensor who owns the intangibles simulta-
neously transfers access to and rights in the intangibles and
retains those rights. Even in a mass market transaction, the
transferee does not seek to own a diskette so much as to have
144. Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 4.
145. See generally Nimmer et al., supra note 8, at 313-25 (discussing the benefits
and detriments of including intangibles in Article 2).
146. Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 4-6.
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the right and the ability to employ the program or information
that is initially contained on that diskette. Often, the diskette
has no value to the transferee shortly after it is received because
the program now resides on the customer's computer. In many
deals, no diskette or tape is used at all because the software is
made available electronically or written on the licensee's own
computer. In short, value is not tied to the media, but rather to
the right to use the media.
The second way in which intangibles contracts are different
from sales of goods is that software and other intangibles are li-
censed rather than sold. A license agreement is a conditional
contractual permit to access, make, use, copy, or otherwise em-
ploy information or other intangible property over which the
licensor has proprietary or other rights of control. 47 Unlike a
sale that is completed on delivery of the goods, commercial li-
censes regulate the behavior of the licensee over a period of
time. As such, commercial licenses more closely resemble a lease
than a sale. The license commonly deals with questions about
the location of use of the program, the right to modify it, the
right to allow others to use the software, the obligation to pay
period fees, and the obligation to return or destroy all copies
when the license terminates. 48
B. Licenses and Sales Compared
Codification of contract rules specially tailored to a topic and
separate from rules for other types of contracts should occur only
if the topic presents unique questions of law and unique pat-
terns of commercial practice that cannot readily be accommodat-
ed under general rules applicable to other types of transactions.
A balancing should be employed to gauge what should be done
in reference to separate tailoring or general applicability. The
contracting field need not be entirely unique, but separate treat-
147. See KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 129, at 63-64; see also NIMMER, supra note
32, 7.02[1].
148. See, e.g., MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding that the use of software by a third party service provider violated the use
restrictions in the license), cert. dismissed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3396 (1994); National Car
Rental Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 176 (1993).
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ment should follow differences in the types of issues faced and in
their commercial solutions. Separate codification is appropriate
if a commercial uniqueness exists relevant to contract form and
expectations.
Articles 2 and 2A deal, respectively, with sales and leases of
goods, while intangibles contracts typically involve a license of
rights in the intangibles. As noted above, a license consists of a
conditional transfer of rights to access, use, copy, or disclose in-
formation or intellectual property that the licensor controls. In
form, a license grants the licensee permission to engage in con-
duct that would otherwise violate rights of the licensor in the
intangibles." In many cases, the license is coupled with action
on the part of the licensor to make the intangibles available to
and usable by the licensee. Such action may involve giving the
licensee a diskette containing a copy of the copyrighted computer
software, giving a licensee documentation and diagrams relating
to a trade secret chemical process, or giving the licensee an
access code to use in obtaining access to a remote electronic
database. But these actions represent differences in delivery
system, not differences in what value is transferred to or con-
tracted for by the licensee.
Both the subject matter and the form of a license transaction
are different from a sale or a lease. As to subject matter, where-
as tangible property may be employed as a means to make the
intangibles available to the licensee, this is not necessary in all
cases and, in any event, the tangibles do not comprise the value
that the licensee receives or anticipates. That value lies in the
intangibles, the performance, or the artistic or scientific value
contained in the right to use or access those intangibles. As to
the form of the transaction, a nonexclusive license is a condition-
al permit to use, rather than a sale of, the intangibles."' Liter-
ally, the licensor retains the intangibles and transfers rights in
them at the same time. For example, unless the contract other-
wise requires, a licensor who grants a nonexclusive license to
149. See KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 129, at 64; see also NIMMER, supra note 32,
5 7.02[11].
150. See NIMMER, supra note 32, 1 7.02[11].
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use software does not by that transfer limit, reduce, or otherwise
restrict its ownership and ability to use the patent itself.'5'
Intellectual property doctrine distinguishes between the intan-
gibles and any media on which they may be contained or tran-
scribed for the purpose of transfer. Thus, a person who leases a
machine that performs a process, the patent of which is owned
by the lessor, may not be able to use the machine unless it also
receives a license with respect to the patent.'52 Transfer of the
tangible item may, or may not, transfer rights in the intangibles.
Similarly, a person who purchases a copy of a word processing
software program receives rights to personal use of the copy pur-
chased, but unless the sale is coupled with an appropriate li-
cense, the buyer of the copy does not obtain a right to transfer
rights to use the intangibles contained on the copy to another
party or to use those intangibles to make a new product.15'
Many obvious differences exist between a license and a sale of
goods. First, licensing deals with contracts that define what an
end user can do with intangible property of the licensor, where-
as a sale involves what quality and cost are associated with
tangible property delivered to a buyer. A second difference lies
in the duration of the end user's obligations and the constraints
under the contract. In a sale, the end user owns the delivered
product with broad rights to use, resell, strip down, destroy, or
otherwise handle the tangible item.' In a license, the end us-
er may or may not "own" the tangible medium that contains the
software (if any tangible media exists), but the possible owner-
ship of the medium does not resolve what it can do with the
technology. 55 The license and underlying intellectual property
law define the restraints, opportunities, and obligations arising
during a prescribed period of time.'
151. See, e.g., Refac Intl Ltd. v. Mastercard Int'l, 758 F. Supp. 152, 155 (S.D.N.Y.
1991) (determining that the patent owner, not the licensee, has the right to enforce
a license through an infringement action); see also KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 129,
at 64.
152. See KINTNER & LAHR, supra note 129, at 14.
153. See 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
154. See Nimmer, supra note 118, at 486.
155. Id.
156. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1993) (use
restrictions in license), cert. dismissed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3386 (1994); National Car Rental
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A transaction involving a license of intellectual property does
not equate to a sale of goods in the substantive issues considered
and the rights balanced. 5 7 Software licenses create ongoing re-
lationships. These license agreements relate not only to the tan-
gible material transferred, but to the contract right to use, oper-
ate, disclose, or modify that technology.5 ' They deal with is-
sues such as the basis of terminating the end user's right to use
technology, the licensor's obligations to upgrade the technology,
the right to access documentation, the obligations to support
user training, and the duty to pay royalties.'59 Although not all
of these issues arise in every deal, none have a clear analogue in
traditional sales transactions. Unlike a sale of goods, a license
that provides for delivery via a tangible medium involves two
different elements in every transaction: (1) the allocation of in-
tangible (use) rights, and (2) the allocation of rights in the tangi-
ble item. 6 '
In 1993, the Article 2 Drafting Committee reached two sepa-
rate decisions in developing a working policy about the treat-
ment of software and related intangibles licensing. First, the
Drafting Committee determined that sufficient differences in the
transactions justified, at least in part, specially tailored rules for
intangibles.' 6' It also found that a number of U.C.C. Article 2
principles did not require special tailoring and could be directly
applicable not only to licenses, but also to leases and other
transactions in personal property.'62 The Committee's second
decision focused primarily on Article 2 provisions dealing with
the formation and interpretation of contracts. 63 The principles
of offer and acceptance, parol evidence, and the like are not
unique to sales, leases, or licenses. This insight contributes to
Sys., Inc. v. Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 176 (1993).
157. See NIMMER, supra note 32, % 6.02[2].
158. See id. 7.19-.24.
159. See generally id. ch. 7.
160. Id. T 6.02[2]. Of course, sometimes the parties transfer no tangible item, in
which case there is only one relationship. But does it resemble the sale of a drill
press?
161. Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 4-6.
162. Id.
163. Id.
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the concept of a "hub and spoke" structure for revised Article 2.
The formation rules are appropriate parts of a hub.
The unique character of licenses and intangibles emerges,
however, in reference to issues of performance, remedies, and
obligations of the contract. In discussing these, it is important to
realize that, while many of us encounter the software and relat-
ed intangibles industries primarily in mass market transactions,
the core of the industry and the nature of the commercial con-
tract practice lie elsewhere. Indeed, the distinction here may be
very much like that between consumer and nonconsumer sales
of goods. Whereas U.C.C. Article 2 applies to both types of
"sales" transactions, clearly the effective rules and the practical
realities associated with consumer transactions are very differ-
ent from those that apply to commercial sales contracts. Article
2 has its most direct effect on the commercial environment,
being largely displaced in the consumer world by federal and
state consumer law." Similarly, in intangibles contracting,
the main focus lies in commercial transactions involving soft-
ware and other licenses, although the same rules and conclu-
sions may also apply to mass market licenses.
In commercial settings, there are many varieties of licensing
transactions currently in the marketplace. These range from
custom contracts in which a programmer develops software for
an end user who is then licensed to use the product, 165 to
transactions that involve preexisting software delivered on tape
or disk under license to the licensee, to license transactions in
which the licensee merely receives a right to access and use the
intangibles remotely, without ever receiving possession or con-
trol of any tangible or intangible property.'66 All of these have
in common the fact that the licensee obtains the rights and
capability to use intangible property that the licensor controls.
164. See, e.g., Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988); Con-
sumers Legal Remedy Act, CAL. CiV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985).
165. See USM Corp. v. Arthur D. Little Sys. 546 N.E.2d 888, 890-92 (Mass. App.
Ct. 1989); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory, 434 N.W.2d 97, 98-100 (Wis. Ct. App.
1988). See generally NIMME, supra note 32, chs. 6-7 (discussing computer and sys-
tems sales contracts and technology licensing and computers).
166. See, e.g., Hospital Computer Sys., Inc. v. Staten Island Hosp., 788 F. Supp.
1351 (D.N.J. 1992).
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This variety illustrates a significant factor in intangibles con-
tracting that differentiates it from sales or leases of goods. Be-
cause the value the transferee obtains lies in access to and
rights in the intangibles, that value can be transferred to the
licensee in many different ways. A number of these transactions
do not involve any discernible "delivery" or "tender of delivery"
to the licensee. Consider, for example, a customer who desires to
obtain reports regarding and processing its accounts receivable.
It can obtain these reports in a variety of ways, including (1)
hiring a software company to program software directly on the
customer's computer and to grant the customer a license to use
that software; (2) acquiring a license to use software from a com-
pany that transfers that software to the customer on disk or by
electronic downloading; or (3) licensing a right to send data by
modem to a software company's own computer that has software
to process the data and return relevant reports. In each case,
the value received by the customer is a license and the actual
ability to employ the vendor's software to process the data and
compile relevant reports.
Many provisions of Article 2 assume that physical delivery
represents the focal point for payment and other obligations of
the parties and that physical handling of the product before and
after default has great significance in gauging the rights and
remedies of the parties."7 Yet, as the accounts receivable
transaction indicates, the idea of physical possession and deliv-
ery are not consistently relevant in intangibles contracts. In an
intangibles contract, physical delivery of media may occur, but
electronic transfers, remote access, written documentation, and a
variety of other methods are equally viable ways of making the
intangibles available to the transferee. Physical delivery is nei-
ther necessary nor always sufficient to transfer the value. The
obligation of the licensor is not to deliver, but to make access
available and to transfer rights in the intangibles. Accommodat-
ing this aspect of the transaction in modern law entails creating
a parallel concept of "transfer of rights" that centers on access
167. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-401 (1990) (transfer of title to goods); id. § 2-602 (requir-
ing rejection within reasonable time after delivery or tender); id. § 2-603 (rejecting
buyer's duties concerning rightfully rejected goods).
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coupled with a right to use and developing default rules for
performance of a contract after access is made available.
The licensed right to use often will entail contractual obliga-
tions that last over a period of time. This durational feature of
intangibles contracts differentiates them from contracts involv-
ing the sale of goods. Article 2 generally does not deal with on-
going relationships, except where the nature of the relationship
involves periodic delivery of additional goods, such as in an in-
stallment or a requirements contract.'68 Because the basic
sales model assumes that the transferee owns the goods after
delivery, there is no discussion of contract terms that restrict
use, location, modification, or disclosure or that establish royalty
or use fees. The Code provides no default positions if the license
is silent. For example, in a commercial license, if the contract
does not specify the rights of the licensee, does it give the licens-
ee a right to use the intangibles in any location that it chooses
or is a single location presumed? If the contract is silent, does
use of the intangibles that goes beyond the licensed terms con-
stitute a breach of the agreement or does it only entail a poten-
tial infringement of copyright or other proprietary interests?'69
The court's analysis in Hospital Computer Systems, Inc. v.
Staten Island Hospital7 ° illustrates the point. Hospital Com-
puter Systems contracted to develop custom software for the
management of Staten Island Hospital's accounting and bill-
ing. 7 ' The data management was handled off-site and pay-
ments for the use of the software were made on the basis of a
monthly "management fee." 7' Nevertheless, based in part on a
stipulation by the parties, the court treated the contract as a
sale of goods, apparently emphasizing the custom development
of the software as a transaction in goods."73 The hospital expe-
168. Id. §§ 2-306, 2-307.
169. See generally Phillip B.C. Jones, Violation of a Patent License Restriction:
Breach of Contract or Patent Infringement?, 33 IDEA J.L. & TECH. 225, 240 (1992-
93) (concluding that a violation of a patent license potentially could raise both
causes of action).
170. 788 F. Supp. 1351 (D.N.J. 1992).
171. Id. at 1354-55.
172. Id. at 1355.
173. Id. at 1361-65.
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rienced more than three years of continuing problems with the
data processing contract before discontinuing the service. 74
Applying Article 2, the court recognized the problems in deter-
mining when undelivered products were treated as having been
accepted, but it framed the issue by considering whether there
was an effective "revocation of acceptance."'75 The facts were
that, eighteen months after the contract began, the client sig-
nalled an intent to end the relationship, even though it did not
terminate the remote access and shift to another data processing
vendor for an additional eighteen months.'76 The court held
that revocation was appropriate, but that the client was es-
topped from recovering fees paid during the eighteen months
from when it first allegedly signalled its intent to withdraw from
the contract and when it eventually did so.'
The point is not that the court reached the wrong result, but
that the language, concepts, and terms of Article 2 are not suit-
ed to transactions in which, after the relationship begins, perfor-
mance by either party gives cause for complaint by the other. A
sales model does not fit the commercial intangibles relationship.
The appropriate questions concern when a right to cancel arises,
whether perfect performance is required in a license, and under
what circumstances does cancellation require contemporaneous
notice. An Article 2 sale of goods model does not reach those is-
sues nor does it reach the core of the problem that the hospital
in Staten Island faced: uncertainty regarding its right to obtain
a copy of the vital data in the vendor's remote computer immedi-
ately after withdrawing from the contract.
Many other aspects of intangibles licenses differ in commer-
cially significant ways from sales of goods. For example, while a
sale" presumes an implied warranty that the seller has title to
the goods,' in a license to use at least some intangibles, the
ordinary commercial expectation does not contain an implied
promise that the licensor is the sole owner of the intangibles or
even that the licensee can use the intangibles without violating
174. Id. at 1354-56.
175. Id. at 1362-63.
176. Id. at 1354-56.
177. Id. at 1365-66.
178. U.C.C. § 2-312 (1990) (Warranty of Title).
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proprietary rights of unknown third parties.'79 Under federal
copyright law, a company hired to develop software for a client
retains ownership of the software unless its contract expressly
provides to the contrary.' 0 Unlike in a sales transaction, title
to intangibles does not pass on delivery, even if the time of de-
livery can be ascertained. Article 2 presumes that the rights of
both parties are assignable and that performance can be delegat-
ed.' 8' In a commercial license, the contrary presumption exists
for nonexclusive licenses.'82 Implied performance warranties
differ.s Licensee remedies do not necessarily involve a right
to retain the property. Rather, breaches or defaults that occur
after the beginning of the license ordinarily are gauged under a
substantial performance standard to determine whether they en-
able the injured party to rescind the contract.M On the other
hand, because a licensor retains some rights in the licensed
intangibles, there may be an implicit right to retake or prevent
continued use of the software after the license ends, more
analogous to the treatment of a lessor in Article 2A, than to the
treatment of a seller in Article 2.18
179. See NIMMER, supra note 32, 7.16.
180. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737-38 (1989).
181. U.C.C. § 2-210(2) (1990) ("Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either [party]
can be assigned except where the assignment would materially change the duty of
the other party, or increase materially the burden or risk imposed on him . . . or
impair materially his chance of obtaining return performance."). The assignability
provisions of Article 2A were extremely controversial and the resulting balance
achieved in the statute is complex. See id. § 2A-303.
182. See, e.g., Harris v. EMUS Records Corp., 734 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 (9th Cir.
1984) (copyright); In re Alltech Plastics, Inc., 71 B.R. 686, 689 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
1987) (patent); cf Sentry Data, Inc. v. Control Data Corp., 87 B.R. 943 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. 1988) (exclusive license).
183. See Snyder v. ISC Alloys, Ltd., 772 F. Supp. 244, 252-53 (W.D. Pa. 1991)
(holding the warranty inapplicable to intangibles); Micro-Managers, Inc. v. Gregory,
434 N.W.2d 97, 102 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988) (finding only a warranty of workmanlike
effort in software development license).
184. See, e.g., Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586-87 (9th Cir. 1993);
Lucasarts Entertainment Co. v. Humongous Entertainment Co., 815 F. Supp. 332,
336-37 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
185. In this context, the licensor may be in a position more like that of a lessor
who has the right to "repossess" its property after default. See U.C.C. § 2A-525
(1990).
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A wise man or woman may once have said that "by any other
name, a cow is still not a horse." This is particularly apt in ref-
erence to the fit between intangibles contracts and U.C.C. law
on the sale of goods. Whether courts label intangibles as goods
and whether they view licenses as sales, the two patterns of
transaction are not the same. They differ in very fundamental
ways that any contract law structure must account for with
reference to the transactions. These differences argue persua-
sively for a separation of the rules applicable to licenses from
the rules applicable to sales.
IV. HUB AND SPOKE
If the Article 2 revision should develop at least some rules
specially tailored to licenses that are distinct from sales or leas-
es, what structure should be used to accommodate them? This
question might be viewed as a mere organizational issue; howev-
er, by focusing on the future role of the U.C.C. and, especially,
Article 2, it presents a more fundamental question. The struc-
tural issue relates to the environment of Article 2 and asks how
an Article 2 revision might be positioned to deal with future
developments in commercial contracting. In an era in which
economic and technological change is a constant, it is appropri-
ate to seek a structure for the revised Article 2 that accommo-
dates future growth and change.
Until now, the assumption has been that discrete transactions
and subject matter should be dealt with under different contract
rules reflected either in common law or in stand-alone articles of
the U.C.C."'8 This belief was most clearly demonstrated by the
adoption of a separate Article 2A dealing with personal property
leases,' but can also be seen in the new Article 4A on funds
transfer.' Yet, the apparent belief in categorical separability
of commercial contracts clearly overstates reality. The reality
lies in a more mixed environment that recognizes both that
there are significant differences relevant to contract law in dis-
186. These discrete transactions are subject to the common rules of U.C.C. Article
1, but Article 1 is thinly populated except by definitions.
187. See U.C.C. § 2A-101 cmt. (1990).
188. See id. § 4A-102 cmt.
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crete transactions and subject matter, and that there are signifi-
cant ways in which contract practice and appropriate commer-
cial contract law principles overlap.
We recognize this commonality in many different contexts. For
example, courts often engage in a selective application of Article
2 sales law to non-sales transactions by analogy.189 Not all at-
tributes of the sale of goods paradigm are appropriate to all
other types of contracts, but some may be appropriate. This
same recognition of overlap among various types of transactions
is also present in the elements of the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts that adopt Article 2 principles to restate common law
rules applicable to non-sales transactions. 9 ' Finally, Article
2A, dealing with transfers of personal property, adopts a number
of rules that differ from Article 2, but also carries significant
portions of Article 2 forward to deal with leases in a form that
involves no substantive departure from the Article 2 provi-
sions.'
Regardless of the content of revised Article 2, it is clear that
these patterns will continue into the future. Additionally, a re-
vised Article 2 that brings in software licensing as an included
transaction places the U.C.C. in the position of dealing with
three distinct contracts that involve transfers of personal proper-
ty: sales, leases, and licenses. In 1993, the Article 2 Drafting
Committee adopted as a preliminary working policy the incorpo-
ration of software and related intangibles contracts into Article 2
through a "hub and spoke" configuration.'92 This hub and
spoke approach is designed to reflect both the overlap and the
differentiation found in these three types of transactions. In a
hub and spoke model, Article 2 would cease to be a "sale of
goods" article and would become an article dealing with commer-
cial "transfers of personal property" in a format that separately
identifies both general contract principles applicable to various
189. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
190. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (imposing a duty
of good faith akin to that found in U.C.C. § 1-203); id. § 208 (forbidding the enforce-
ment of unconscionable contracts as in U.C.C. § 2-302).
191. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-202, 2A-202 (1990) (parol evidence); id. §§ 2-204, 2A-204
(formation); id. §§ 2-208, 2A-207 (course of performance).
192. Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 4-6.
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types of transactions and transaction-specific principles tailored
to particular types of commercial contract relationships.'93
A goal of symmetry and consistency of law should drive the
U.C.C. revision process. A hub and spoke framework does not
guarantee this result with reference to transactions covered in
the U.C.C., but it does provide a reasonable format to work to-
ward this objective. Additionally, by placing general rules that
do not depend on the particular transaction in a hub category, a
single rule could be applicable to sales, leases, licenses, and any
other transactions to which the U.C.C. might be extended in the
future. This latter point is important. The challenge of respond-
ing to a changed economy, and to changes in which commercial
relationships drive that economy, will not end simply on resolv-
ing the question of how and where software and related intangi-
bles contracts are dealt with in the U.C.C. Rather, other types of
transactions and subject matters may rise to importance in the
future. A hub and spoke format potentially achieves efficiencies
and substantive benefits in this context of continuing change.
Also, hub provisions would be more readily applicable by analo-
gy to transactions not squarely within Article 2, whereas the
existence of differentiated "spoke" treatment of different types of
transactions may yield better analogies for courts to tailor analy-
ses to new transaction formats and subject matter.
As this Article is written, the details of the hub and spoke
model, and even its feasibility as a framework for Article 2 revi-
sion, have yet to be developed by the Article 2 Drafting Commit-
tee. Rather than attempt to outline in detail the elements of a
concept whose full structure has not yet evolved, I will take on a
more limited task.
I focus on a general question that is engaged by an effort to
develop a hub and spoke structure for Article 2: how does one
define the principles to be incorporated into an Article 2 hub? I
outline two different strategies. The first focuses on what pro-
visions are common to the already codified paradigms of sales
and leases of goods, along with an analysis of what contract
principles should be applicable to licenses. A hub provision ex-
ists if the same principle applies to each of these three areas.
193. Id.
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The second, more ambitious, approach supplements this analysis
by looking to other potential sources of commercial law principle
and developing entirely new rules for inclusion in a hub. Thus,
for example, one might refer to commercially significant prin-
ciples adopted in the Restatement or to principles that emerge
from a closer scrutiny of codified rules that contain different
specific applications.
Another question deals with the other side of the formulation
issue: how does one define what substantive rules should go into
the spoke provisions applicable to sales, leases, and licenses? As
I have earlier argued, my view is that commercial contract prac-
tice should serve as the primary source of default rules to be
adopted in a codification, rather than some theoretical construct
about what should be commercial practice in an abstract envi-
ronment. Yet, not all practices merit treatment in a codification
of sales, lease, or license contract law. In defining spoke provi-
sions we need to ask not only what aspects of these various
types of transactions are commercially unique, but which aspects
of contract practice have sufficient importance or sufficient un-
certainty in law to be brought into a codification regime?
A. The Concept Defined
The "hub and spoke" idea argues that there are basic contract
law principles that apply across all types of transactions that
might be viewed as commercial transfers of personal property.
These principles can be stated separate and apart from contract
law rules that apply only to specific types of transactions (e.g.,
leases, sales, or licenses) or particular types of property (e.g.,
goods, intangibles, or services).-By stating these basic principles
as an identifiable body of contract law, one can facilitate the
coordination and symmetry of the current drafting process and
establish a more flexible base for inclusion of additional commer-
cial transactions within the Article 2 contract law structure.
In a "hub and spoke" configuration, the general transactional
principles would form the "hub" provisions of the revised Article
2. Depending on how one frames the search for "hub" provisions,
these provisions will include many current Article 2 rules about
contract formation and interpretation supplemented perhaps by
additional topics drawn from the Restatement or other sources of
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commercial contract law. The "spoke" provisions consist of con-
tract law rules that are particularly applicable to specific types
of transactions. These could be placed in subparts of revised
Article 2, defined to apply specifically to the particular subject
matter. Thus, for example, one could conceive of current Article
2A as a form of "spoke" applicable to leases. Under this struc-
ture, one spoke would be applicable to sales of goods and anoth-
er spoke would be applicable to transfers involving intangibles,
including software contracts. Future revisions might create addi-
tional spokes to cover transactions in other types of personal
property or services as economic and other considerations justify
such action.
A hub and spoke configuration might appear in the form
shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
HuB AND SPOKE STRUCTURE
Article 2: Transfers of Personal Property
PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS (HuB)
(§§ 100-200)
- statute of frauds
- parol evidence
- offer-acceptance
-4 unconscionablity
-4 etc.
PART II PART III PART IV OR ART.2A
SALES OF GOODS LICENSES AND LEASES OF GOODS
INTANGIBLES
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For purposes of this discussion, Table 1 assumes that leases are
brought within revised Article 2, but the hub and spoke concept
does not require merger of these provisions. A hub and spoke
can be achieved by leaving leases in current Article 2A, but
ensuring that the terms of the "hub" provisions do not entail
substantive differences not justified by the nature of the transac-
tion.
The underlying rationale for a hub and spoke methodology
stems from the radical changes that have occurred in the United
States and the global economy since the promulgation of Article
2 and from projections about the directions in which that econo-
my is headed.' These events unmistakably expand the focus
of commercial transactions from goods to intangibles and servic-
es contracts of various types. The changes in these and other
areas fundamentally alter the nature of commercial practice and
the demands placed on commercial contract law. The changes in
economic activity also have expanded the types of transactions
that have economic and commercial significance.
In Article 2, the specific issue that caused the Drafting Com-
mittee to consider a hub and spoke framework involved how to
deal with software and related intangibles contracts within the
U.C.C. Article 2 revision.'95 There are essentially three ways of
dealing with this issue. One approach would be to fully integrate
the intangibles transactions within Article 2, making separate
provisions or exceptions for intangibles licensing as appropriate.
An alternative would place intangibles contracts in an entirely
separate article with self-contained provisions like the format
used for Article 2A. The hub and spoke structure postulates an
intermediate choice that deals with intangibles separately to the
extent that there are transactional or subject matter differences,
but builds a set of general commercial contract principles that
need not be separately restated for this subject matter.
This drafting style blends growth potential and fundamental
stability. The concept accommodates software and related licens-
ing without forcing these transactions into a sale of goods model,
while leaving the framework of Article 2 sufficiently open to deal
194. Nimmer & Speidel, supra note 4, at 3.
195. Id. at 4.
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with continuing changes in commercial practice. This blended
approach will recognize expressly that Article 2 is not confined
to sales of goods, but has broader application in terms of both
the types of transactions that are governed in detail within Arti-
cle 2 and the types of transactions to which general Article 2
provisions may be applied by analogy or by adoption of a broad
scope for the hub provisions of Article 2.
B. Defining the Hub
Defining the hub provisions of Article 2 is important because
these are likely to have extended impact on contract law outside
of current Article 2 parameters whether or not a revised article
specifically provides for such broader coverage. The basic prem-
ise in a hub and spoke system holds that general principles of
contract law can be codified independent of the peculiarities of
specific types of transactions or subject matter. This appears
relatively obvious, but it forces explicit attention to several fun-
damental issues that center on defining what content should be
provided for a set of hub principles in the U.C.C.
Consider two related questions. First, what source or sources
of general law should be used to define the "hub"? Second, what
distinguishes a general contract principle which should be left to
"common law" from a general commercial contract law principle
that should be placed in a codified "hub"? Initially, one might
approach defining hub provisions in a way that avoids this fun-
damental scrutiny. This approach defines the hub principles of
Article 2 in terms of the contract principles that have already
been codified for transactions involving sales of goods and leases
of personal property. Specifically, one would identify a hub by
contrasting existing Article 2 with existing Article 2A, augment-
ed by an analysis of which provisions of law common to these
two U.C.C. articles could also be applied to transactions involv-
ing licenses of intangibles. Essentially, the "hub" could be de-
fined by what aspects of contract law have already been codified
and asking which of these merit designation as contract rules
that (with perhaps a change in language) apply equally to sales
and leases of goods, and to intangibles contracts, the three
themes that are or have been considered pertinent to the U.C.C.
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This approach creates a manageable task and an identifiable
reference point grounded in current law because it relies on his-
torical decisions to build a modern choice about what should be
included in revised Article 2. The historical choices made in cur-
rent Article 2 have stood the test of time and were at least part-
ly adopted in Article 2A. A comparison of Article 2 and Article
2A along with a comparison of various suggestions respecting
intangibles contracts provides a view of what a hub and spoke
might look like under an analysis that relies on existing materi-
al and existing choices.
Thus, one could ask whether there are material reasons why
contract rules dealing with parol evidence, 9 ' offer and accep-
tance,'97 firm offers,'98 and similar formation or interpreta-
tion rules should be specially tailored and different in content
for different types of commercial contracts, rather than being
made applicable in identical form to all forms of commercial
transactions. If no valid reason exists to treat these rules as re-
quiring different outcomes for different transactions, the general
rules contained in Article 2 should apply uniformly at least to
the types of transactions defined as being within the scope of
revised Article 2.
Table 2 below shows one form of a hub combining sales, leas-
es, and intangibles contracts. This model is based in part on
current Code sections applicable to all three topics. It includes
provisions of Article 2 that are substantially duplicated in Arti-
cle 2A (or that at least are not contradicted in Article 2A) and
that, at least as a preliminary matter, will not require substan-
tively different treatment in codification of contract principles
applicable to intangibles licenses.
196. E.g., U.C.C. § 2-202 (1990); id. § 2A-202.
197. E.g., id. § 2-206; id. § 2A-206.
198. E.g., id. § 2-205; id. § 2A-205.
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TABLE 2
BAsIc HUB PROVISIONS
ARTICLE 2: HuB PROVISIONS
PART A: GENERAL PROVISIONS
101 Title "Transactions in Personal Property"
102 Scope (former 102)
103 Definitions
201 Statute of Frauds (former 201)
202 Parol Evidence (former 202)
203 Seals (former 203)
204 Formation (former 204)
205 Firm Offers (former 205)
206 Offer and Acceptance (former 206)
207 Additional Terms (former 207)
208 Course of Performance (former 208)
209 Modification, Rescission, and Waiver (former 209)
210 Obligations of Parties (former 301)
211 Unconscionability (former 302)
212 Allocation of Risks (former 303)
213 Adequate Assurance (former 609)
214 Anticipatory Repudiation (former 610)
215 Retraction of Repudiation (former 611)
216 Substituted Performance (former 614)
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217 Excuse by Failed Condition (former 615)
218 Procedure: Notice Claiming Excuse (former 616)
219 Modification of Remedy by Contract (former 719)
220 Cumulation of Warranties (former 317)
221 Remedy for Fraud (former 721)
222 Proof of Market Price, Etc. (former 723)
223 Admissible Market Quote (former 724)
224 Incidental Damages: Defined (former 710; 715)
225 Consequential Damages: Defined (former 715)
Table 2 assumes changes in the language of Article 2 sections to
eliminate the focus on sales and to coordinate revised Article 2
with the often slightly modified language adopted in Article 2A.
As Table 2 indicates, the majority of potential hub provisions
lies in areas of contract formation and contract interpretation.
This includes the first twelve substantive rules noted in Table 2.
Significantly, many of these same U.C.C. rules have been car-
ried forward into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts9' and
thus state a preferred formulation of common law principles.
The other common provisions relate to uncertainties in perfor-
mance (e.g., repudiation, excuse) or to proof and definition is-
sues. Again, one can identify clear parallels between these
U.C.C. provisions and similar rules in the Restatement.21' The
relationship between these general hub provisions and the terms
of the modern Restatement suggests one approach to a broader
formulation of an Article 2 U.C.C. hub. A discussion on that ap-
proach, however, must be prefaced by a discussion of some resid-
ual issues with respect to this first definition of hub provisions.
199. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 9-109 (1979) (restating the
common law requirements of basic contract formation, including offer, acceptance,
and consideration).
200. See, e.g., id. §§ 231-260 (discussing issues of performance and nonperformance).
1994] 1393
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:1337
Table 2 excludes some contract rules on which Article 2 and
2A agree. The most notable absences are the implied perfor-
mance warranties. 2 1 The Drafting Committee has yet to re-
view what performance warranties are appropriate in licensing
transactions based on modern commercial expectations. Al-
though many software licenses are held to be within Article 2
and thus covered under its implied performance warranties,0 2
it is not clear that the general commercial expectation or devel-
oped case law regarding intangibles contracts generally supports
this in transactions exclusive of software. As earlier noted, alter-
native warranty rules exist relating to information and services
contracts, while standard practice in commercial software licens-
ing involves disclaimer of the implied warranty of merchantabili-
ty.
The hub model represented in Table 2 includes a statute of
frauds provision, but this inclusion may be problematic. The
provisions of current Article 2 and Article 2A contain statute of
frauds rules,0 ' but the substantive terms of these rules are not
identical. The discrepancies reflect the difference between a sin-
gle delivery contract (a sale) and an ongoing relationship (a
lease).0 4 Yet both current statutes reflect the view that a writ-
ing to evidence the transaction is a formal requisite. The differ-
ence between sales and lease law may be exacerbated, however,
in the Article 2 revision. Although no final action has yet been
taken, the Drafting Committee has voted at least twice to abol-
ish the statute of frauds for sales transactions. The Study Com-
mittee that recommended revision of Article 2 suggested that
this step might be desirable.0 5 Should this view continue, a
coordination issue exists between Article 2 and 2A. Basically,
whether framed through the window of a hub and spoke struc-
ture or not, one must ask whether there are transactional dif-
ferences between leases and sales that justify repeal of the stat-
201. U.C.C. §§ 2-314, 2-315, 2A-212, 2A-213 (1990).
202. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
203. U.C.C. §§ 2-201, 2A-201 (1990).
204. See id. § 2A-201 cmt. ("[C]hanges [from § 2-201] reflect the differences be-
tween a lease contract and a contract for the sale of goods.").
205. Id. § 2-201 (Discussion Draft Sept. 10, 1993) (stating that a contract is "en-
forceable whether or not there is a writing" thereby repealing the statute of frauds).
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ute of frauds for one and retention of a statute of frauds for the
other. Additionally, it will be necessary to determine where
intangibles licenses fit in reference to this rule.
The relationship between the potential hub rules and the pro-
visions of the modern Restatement indicates that a more aggres-
sive approach to hub provisions for general commercial contract
law may be appropriate. This approach would look beyond what
already exists in the current U.C.C. and would ask which con-
tract principles are applicable as a codified body of general com-
mercial contract law rules. One would look to the provisions of
the Restatement, to general common law patterns that may (or
may not) conform to the Restatement, and to general issues of
commercial law practice, perhaps as embedded in the more par-
ticularized rules of Articles 2 and 2A.
One must ask a number of questions about the basic process
of codification. There should be a basic premise that states the
reasons why a particular rule should or should not be codified. A
decision to codify for commercial contract purposes creates a rule
of decision grounded in legislative terminology and acted on by
the legislatures of each state. A decision to not codify, on the
other hand, leaves the contract law principle to common law
judicial action perhaps, but not necessarily, based on the provi-
sions of prevailing Restatements. As we have seen, there are
many potential benefits of codification. One could argue that a
contract law rule should not be brought into the U.C.C. unless
that action will (or may) provide commercial benefits associated
with one of the foregoing features of codification. Arguably, for
example, the treatment by the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
of rules about consideration to form a contract206 is not an im-
portant area for codification of commercial contract law develop-
ment. Consideration rules are seldom an issue in commercial
contracts as contrasted to noncommercial contract development.
In an heterogeneous environment, more context driven rulings of
common law courts are better suited. The existence of scattered
state law statutes and deviations or differences between states
is less significant than in cases where commerce occurs on a
national basis.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 71-94 (1979).
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Dealing with hub definitions in this broader form entails a
more basic reassessment of Article 2 (and related law) than
called for in merely redressing earlier mistakes and tinkering
with existing language. Whether this effort is worth the cost
depends in part on how one views the scope of general law pro-
visions in revised Article 2. That scope could either be limited to
the scope contained in the various spoke provisions that supple-
ment the hub or it could be defined to encompass a broader
segment of contract law.
The second formulation encourages a broader approach to the
hub. It postulates that certain contract principles can be stated
independently of the sales, lease, and license transactions that
might be within Articles 2 and 2A and that this statement of
principles in codified form would benefit commercial practice
outside of the scope of a revised Article 2. The narrower formu-
lation argues for less analysis of what should go into a hub. It
would suggest that one should look only to the several areas
directly governed by revised Article 2 and ask whether there are
uncodified principles which if codified would benefit practice in
those areas.
While the dichotomy phrased in terms of "what is covered by
Article 2" suggests a clean analytical structure, in practice no
such dichotomy exists. To believe that it does is to ignore how
courts already use Article 2. The use of Article 2 by analogy in
cases not at all within the realm of "sales" of "goods" is both an
accepted and a significant practice. Use of Article 2 rules by
analogy is encouraged by the Code, supported by most authors,
and often seized on by courts disinclined to dwell in the vagaries
and uncertainties of common law in the fifty states."7 This is
neither surprising nor unusual. In many respects, many U.C.C.
sections state what have become commercially acceptable con-
tract law principles.
The fact that many courts use Article 2 principles outside the
scope of Article 2 argues that an Article 2 revision should con-
sider this non-Article 2 realm. The hub provides a context for
207. See Page Petroleum Inc. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505, 510-11 (Tex.
1993) (adopting the U.C.C.'s definition of "conspicuousness" for use in Texas business
law).
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this. To show how one might derive broader hub provisions, a
few illustrations are useful. There are many examples, but I will
consider standardized contracts and warranties of title.
1. Standard Form Contracts
Parties use standard form contracts in many commercial and
consumer transactions. In some cases, the standard form is em-
ployed in what amounts to an adhesion context in which the
party who does not draft or supply the form lacks bargaining
power to makes changes in its terms.0 8 In other settings, how-
ever, standard forms are employed even though, at least in theo-
ry, the party receiving the form could negotiate changes in some
of the terms. In these latter contexts, they are employed as a
matter of convenience and efficiency, rather than as an effort at
over-reaching or oppression."9 To the extent that standard
form documents are seen to raise issues separate and apart from
written contracts generally, treatment of such contracts should
be addressed in revised Article 2 because of the general commer-
cial applicability of these issues.
While standard form contracts are common, current Articles 2
and 2A contain essentially no provisions that directly address
the extent to which a form that has not been read or negotiated
by the receiving party nevertheless should be enforceable accord-
ing to its own terms. Case law considers standard form contracts
in various settings, including warranty disclaimer and parol evi-
dence rules.210 The pattern of decision varies. Some courts
adopt a view that the party must be presumed to have read and
reacted to a document it receives, or to have had a duty to do so,
208. The use of a standard form contract between parties of unequal bargaining
power does not invalidate the boilerplate language automatically however, unless the
provision is unconscionable. Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (8th
Cir. 1986).
209. See, e.g., Modem Computer Sys., Inc. v. Modern Banking Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d
734 (8th Cir. 1989) (choice of law clause valid as part of standard form); Marston v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 439 F.2d 1035 (1st Cir. 1971) (only room for name of
one insured on form for convenience of billing).
210. See O'Neil v. Int'l Harvester, 575 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1978) (holding that because
the parol evidence rule does not restrict evidence of fraud, the buyer may argue that
it is fraudulent to make an express warranty and then disclaim it in a standard
form writing).
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especially when both parties are merchants. These courts con-
clude that the entire contract is fully enforceable.2 ' Other
courts expressly or implicitly look less favorably on form agree-
ments, often negating some or all of the effect of the form, espe-
cially in cases involving consumers or small business own-
ers.
212
Unlike current U.C.C. rules, section 211 of the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts deals with "standardized agreements" in
an effort to balance the respective interests that appear to arise
in cases in which such documents are employed.' Those inter-
ests balance, on the one hand, the concept that contract law
traditionally assumes agreement to written terms from agree-
ment to the general contract without requiring proof of consent
to each specific term, and, on the other hand, the belief that
form contracts may involve adhesion and settings in which the
actual terms of the contract unfairly surprise the other party.
The Restatement provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (3), where a party to an
agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent to a writing
and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he
adopts the writing ....
(3) Where the other party has reason to believe that the par-
ty manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew that
the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part
of the agreement. 4
The Restatement focus on standard form terms emphasizes the
extent to which the terms of the agreement are within the rea-
sonable expectations of the party against whom the terms are
being asserted.
211. See generally Donald B. King, New Perspective on Standard Form Contracts: A
Subject Revisited, 1993 COM. LAW. ANN. 87; W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of
Contract: The Transformation of Contracts by Standard Forms, 46 U. PrIT. L. REV.
21 (1984).
212. See, e.g., Angus Medical Co. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 840 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1992).
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1979).
214. Id.
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In Angus Medical Co. v. Digital Equipment Corp.,215 the
court applied common law concepts to a contract to convert ex-
isting software to run on a different computer. An issue of fact
existed about whether a contract limitation on time to bring a
claim was enforceable.21 The court used section 211 of the Re-
statement to hold that limiting the time to eighteen months
might be invalid.217 The Restatement standard was described in
the following terms:
"Although customers typically adhere to standardized agree-
ments and are bound by them without even appearing to
know the standard terms in detail, they are not bound to
unknown terms which are beyond the range of reasonable
expectation .... [A] party who adheres to the other party's
standard terms does not assent to a term if the other party
has reason to believe that the adhering party would not have
accepted the agreement if he had known the agreement con-
tained the particular term."218
Article 2A does not deal with form contracts. The closest that
Article 2 comes to the issues arising from the use of standard
forms is its treatment of the battle of the forms problem con-
tained in current U.C.C. section 2-207.219 That section deals
with cases in which the contracting parties exchange forms or
confirming memoranda.22 The provisions of this section are
controversial and undoubtedly will be altered in the Article 2
revision." Basically, the section deals with two different situa-
tions. One involves an exchange of conflicting forms (the so-
called "battle of forms"). This aspect of section 2-207 attempts to
preserve an agreement between the parties despite conflicting
forms, defining the agreement to have terms based on what
215. 840 P.2d 1024 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1992).
216. Id. at 1027.
217. Id. at 1029-30.
218. Id. at 1030 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. f
(1979)).
219. U.C.C. § 2-207 (1990).
220. Article 2A, although it adopts numerous provisions of Article 2, does not adopt
an equivalent to § 2-207.
221. See Slawson, supra note 211, at 56-60 (relating the history and purposes of
U.C.C. § 2-207).
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language in one form matches the other and resorting to Code
gap-filler rules when the two forms are materially different and
acceptance of the contract is pro forma conditioned on consent to
the terms of one or the other form.222 The section also deals
with forms that propose additional terms. It holds that, as be-
tween merchants, proposed additional terms become part of the
contract unless "(a) the original offer expressly limits acceptance
to the terms of the offer; (b) the additional terms materially
modify it; or (c) notice of objection to the additional terms is giv-
en."
2 23
The conflicting forms involved in a section 2-207 problem very
often entail a purchase order and shipping invoice." As a
matter of fact, the forms are often not read by either party,
except in reference to the price and quantity terms involved in
the order or shipment.2 25 This is due to an emphasis on effi-
ciency and speed of processing, but it contradicts the traditional
assumptions that we often make about the nature of contracting
and the willingness of parties to dicker for terms or, even, to
conduct substantial negotiations. In most cases involving a "bat-
tle of forms," probably no actual "battle" occurs. The parties may
simply act on the ordinary business assumption that in most
sales transactions there will be no problems with the delivered
goods and that it is not worth the effort to conduct negotiations
or disrupt business to deal with those few cases in which a prob-
lem arises and the parties cannot resolve it amicably.
2 6
In licensing, battle of the forms problems occur between mer-
chants frequently and standard form agreements are common.
Additionally, however, there is a controversy about the enforce-
ability of so-called "shrink wrap" licenses, which are form license
agreements included within a mass market software package
222. U.C.C. § 2-207(3) (1990).
223. Id. § 2-207(2).
224. See, e.g., American Ins. Co. v. El Paso Pipe and Supply Co., 978 F.2d 1185
(10th Cir. 1992); Stedor Enters., Ltd. v. Armtex, Inc., 947 F.2d 727 (4th Cir. 1991).
225. See, e.g., N & D Fashions, Inc. v. DHJ Indus., Inc., 548 F.2d 722 (8th Cir.
1976); Bergquist Co. v. Sunroc Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1236 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
226. Cf. Lawrence Kalevitch, Gaps in Contracts: A Critique of Consent Theory, 54
MONT. L. REv. 169, 176-77 (1993) (noting that the "efficiency" theory of contract law
postulates that parties "pre-consent" to efficient gap-fillers).
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with the provision that, by opening the package or using the
software, the licensee consents to the terms of the agree-
ment.22 The shrink wrap agreements ordinarily do not involve
a conflict of forms, but rather a standard form agreement that
purports to alter the terms of the transaction to avoid it being
an ordinary retail sale. In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software
Ltd.,228 the lower court held that a shrink wrap contract was
an unenforceable contract of adhesion under Louisiana law. 9
This lower court opinion reached that result with virtually no
analysis.' 0
Standard form agreements are sufficiently ubiquitous as to
suggest that treatment in revised Article 2 is appropriate. In at
least some respects, issues about surprise and oppression seem
to be independent of the type of transaction or property in-
volved. Arguably, this suggests treatment in a hub provision.
Alternatively, issues about mass market software licenses might
be separated out as a special application of standard form con-
tract analysis.
2. Warranty of Title
Current U.C.C. section 2-312 contains an implied warranty
that the seller has transferred title that is "good" and that the
transfer was "rightful.""' The comments to the section indicate
that it "abolished" the warranty of "quiet possession," although a
pattern of challenges to title that disturbs the buyer's possession
might be one of the ways to establish breach of the warran-
ty.12 This same section also contains a warranty that the
goods will be delivered free of any rightful claim of infringe-
ment."3
227. For a discussion of these contracts, see NIMER, supra note 32, 7.24[1][b].
228. 655 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. La. 1987).
229. Id. at 761.
230. Id. (stating that the shrink wrap contract was one of adhesion with no sup-
porting analysis).
231. U.C.C. § 2-312(1)(a) (1990).
232. Id. § 2-312 cmt. 1.
233. Id. § 2-312(1)(b).
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The title warranties in Article 2A, in contrast, contain an im-
plied warranty against interference and infringement.' Since
the lessor does not transfer title, the conditions of this warranty
are different from those in Article 2. The warranty provides spe-
cifically that no person holds a claim or interest to the goods
"which will interfere with the lessee's enjoyment of its leasehold
interest."235 This, of course, states a warranty of quiet enjoy-
ment, but does not contain a representation about the lessor's
ownership. Article 2A, however, also contains a non-infringe-
ment warranty like that of Article 2 that refers to delivery of the
goods free of any infringement claim.235
In dealing with intangibles licenses, the idea of title becomes
much more obscure than in reference to goods that are singular
in character. A license to use software may be granted by one
who owns the relevant intellectual property jointly with another
person who may or may not join in the license. 7 Similarly,
under current general law, there is an issue about whether the
transfer (license) contains a representation that the copyright (or
patent, or secrecy claim) in the software is valid."3 Simply
stated, one can transfer rights in software and then have a situ-
ation in which the transferee received only information or tech-
nology that is in the public domain. Finally, transfer of a right
to use software (or other intangibles) will seldom involve an
infringement per se. It is the actual use or copying of the proper-
ty by the licensee that may entail an infringement. 9 In com-
mon practice, it is not always the case that the licensor warrants
that the licensee can use its technology without infringing the
technology (patent or copyright) of another.
One conclusion from all of this might be that the title warran-
ties are inherently different and clearly placed in a spoke pat-
tern, different for each transaction. A broader view, however,
might suggest that at least one common principle exists in all
three areas and that this principle might have even broader
234. Id. § 2A-211.
235. Id. § 2A-211(1).
236. See id. § 2A-211(2).
237. See NIMMER, supra note 32, 7.1612].
238. See id. 7.16[1].
239. See id. 5 1.0314].
1402
INTANGIBLES CONTRACTS
significance. For example, the broader principle may be that, in
any transfer of personal property or services, the transferor
impliedly warrants that it has a right to transfer the interest
that it purports to convey. The details of that basic principle
may differ depending on the particular type of transaction.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This Article has covered a lot of ground. The fundamental
point that I have raised deals with the context of the modern
revisions of Article 2. That context is not simply an academic
exercise in upgrading an old statute and curing the intermittent
problems that have been discovered in some portions of current
law. It involves, rather, a needed response to a fundamentally
changed economy and transactional structure. To act as if a stat-
ute from the 1950's can simply be touched up and left to govern
transactions into the next century is to essentially ignore the sea
of change that has occurred in how we, as a country and as indi-
viduals, do business as well as the commercial value that new
forms of business represent.
Software and related intangibles licenses should be included
within the revised Article 2 in an explicit and conscious manner.
Technology, intellectual property, and information transfers are
cornerstones of modern commerce. The contract relationships
that spring up around this subject matter are important. As we
have seen, the Article 2 Drafting Committee recognized this fact
in its working policy to the effect that licensing contracts of soft-
ware and related intangibles should be included in the Article 2
revision process and treated under a hub and spoke methodolo-
gy.
This inclusionary proposition allows the Drafting Committee
to handle Article 2 revision in a real world environment. It is
preferable to deal with important fields of commercial contract-
ing through codification, rather than common law development.
To support that preference, we briefly discussed and compared
the two processes and the likelihood that either will yield com-
mercially relevant, supportive contract law principles. Modern
contract scholarship documents the difficulty of deriving consis-
tent premises about how to use law to support contracting prac-
tice in the absence of any true understanding of how contract
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practice and law interact. Yet, even without an ability to gauge
effects, a commercial law of contracts will evolve. This indicates
that we should draft default rules that enable contractual flexi-
bility, but that draw on the experience and shared expertise of
actual commercial contracting as a gauge for what structures
and expectations are appropriate. To achieve that goal, the bet-
ter process is codification, rather than pure common law devel-
opment.
Under any criteria one might assert for judging when a partic-
ular transaction should be brought into a codification process,
software and related intangibles qualify. This is a natural exten-
sion of the commercial code reflecting national commercial be-
havior. Intangibles contracts involve significant national indus-
tries. The attempt to fit them into a mold developed for sales of
goods creates numerous problems and a failure to fit modern
law to modern commercial practice.
In many respects, intangibles licenses cannot be equated to
sales or leases of goods in terms of either the type of subject
matter or the type of commercial relationship created by con-
tracts involving intangibles. This establishes a need for differen-
tiation. Separate treatment of licenses is merited. Leases, sales,
and licenses all may draw on a common core of basic contract
principles, but each also demands some specially tailored rules
to reflect the type of contractual relationship that exists in com-
mercial reality.
That separate treatment should be developed initially under a
hub and spoke approach to a new Article 2. Historically, the
assumption has been that discrete transactions and subject mat-
ter should be dealt with under different contract rules reflected
either in common law or in stand alone articles of the U.C.C.
But this overemphasizes the differences and creates severe prob-
lems of coordination. Under the hub and spoke system, Article 2
would cease to be a "sale of goods" article and would become an
article concerning commercial "transfers of personal property"
poised to deal not only with the economy of today, but to expand
into the economy of tomorrow.
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